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Abstract 
 
This thesis explores the question of whether there has been a “new” 
securitization of United States foreign policy in Africa since the late 1990s. It 
follows a stream of literature and real-world evidence suggesting that U.S. 
engagement with African countries has taken on a more securitized tone in the 
years since the end of the twentieth century.  This thesis suggests that there are 
three key factors behind this securitization: oil, terrorism and the rise of China. I 
explore these factors in the context of wider U.S.-Africa engagement before 
examining in greater detail the case of the changing U.S. relationship with 
Nigeria. As one of Africa’s major oil producers as well as a site of terrorist activity 
and Chinese expansion, the case of Nigeria demonstrates how securitization has 
occurred and what effects this has had on the country and the wider African 
situation.  
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Section 1: Introduction, theory and context 
 
Introduction 
The purpose of this thesis is to examine whether there has been a renewed 
securitization of United States (U.S.) foreign policy since Africa in the late 1990s. 
There has been a strand of literature and a stream of real-world evidence 
suggesting that U.S. foreign policy in Africa has become more and more 
securitized in the years since the late 1990s and early 2000s, mimicking the shift 
in U.S. engagement with Middle Eastern countries following the Second World 
War. The Middle East moved from a peripheral position in U.S. foreign policy to 
centre stage in a matter of years as factors like energy security and terrorism 
came to the fore. The recognition by the U.S. of the strategic value of oil in and 
around the Arabian Gulf and, later on, the danger of terrorist groups emerging in 
this region, caused the U.S. to focus on building relationships with key countries 
based on security and defense. The foundation of the post-war alliance between 
the United States and Saudi Arabia, for instance, was the security guarantee 
provided by the stationing of American troops in Saudi Arabia as well as the 
United States’ willingness to provide the Saudis with advanced weaponry, 
military technology and training. In return, the Saudis granted the U.S. 
preferential access to their oil (Askari et al., 2009, p.102).  This thesis aims to 
examine whether a similar situation is playing out now in Africa, where alongside 
energy security and terrorism, the rise of China have resulted in U.S. engagement 
taking on a more securitized tone. I will explore these claims in relation to the 
wider African context before testing them in depth based on a case study of U.S. 
engagement with Nigeria.  
 
Why have I selected the United States, Africa, and Nigeria? Firstly, the United 
States is the world’s largest consumer of oil and also has the world’s largest 
military budget. Despite the so-called ‘rise of the rest’ (the increasing military, 
economic and diplomatic weight of countries like China, Brazil, and India) the 
United States remains the world’s preeminent power and is likely to remain so 
for the foreseeable future. No other country is as globally engaged as the United 
States, and its actions will therefore have consequences that are felt the world 
over. If a securitization of U.S. policy in Africa occurs, the effects will be felt not 
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only on the African continent, but in other distant countries. Furthermore, thanks 
to the effects of globalisation and rising interdependence, “even distant disorder 
can have effects that hurt, influence, or disturb the majority of people living 
within the United States” (Nye Jr, 1991); events taking place in faraway Africa 
can have profound consequences not just for the United States but the rest of the 
world as well.   
 
Secondly, Africa is home to several of the world’s fastest growing economies, 
such as Nigeria, Sierra Leone, Niger, the Cote D’Ivoire, Burkina Faso, Chad, 
Ethiopia and Liberia (CIA). Many of the world’s future economic powerhouses 
will be located on the continent thanks to growing trade and abundant natural 
resources. As economic power grows so does hard power and the capacity to 
have an impact on world affairs. Yet Africa still remains conflict-stricken and 
plagued by poverty, corruption and poor governance. What happens on a 
continent that will be so important to future world prosperity is worthy of study. 
 
Finally, Nigeria was selected as a test case because it is a key country in Africa. It 
has the continent’s largest population, second-largest economy, and is a leading 
producer of high quality light oil and gas. It has played a central role in 
peacekeeping and stability operations throughout the region, in countries such as 
Togo, Mauritania, Liberia, Sudan, Sierra Leone and the Cote d’Ivoire (Ploch, 2007, 
p.15). Nigeria is a member of the Organization of Petroleum Exporting States 
(OPEC) and is a key member of the Economic Community of West African States 
(ECOWAS). One senior American foreign policy officer stated that “No country’s 
fate is so decisive for the continent. No other country across a range of issues has 
the power so thoroughly to shape outcomes elsewhere in sub-Saharan Africa” 
(Ploch, 2007, p.1). For these reasons, the United States’ relationship with Nigeria 
and the consequences of this engagement are important in terms of the future of 
the African continent as well as the global economy. This is especially true given 
that Nigeria faces numerous challenges to its stability which have helped to 
justify the securitization of U.S. engagement with the country. Despite enormous 
oil revenues, much of the country remains chronically underdeveloped. Poverty 
levels are very high and weak governance and corruption has obstructed the 
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development of critical infrastructure, social services and broad-based economic 
growth. Much of Nigeria’s history since independence has been shaped by 
military rule and competition for control between northern and southern elites: 
the government was dominated by Northern military leaders until the first 
democratic elections were held in 1999 (Ploch, 2007, p.2). Given this legacy, 
human rights remain an issue, particularly among government security forces, 
and ethnic and religious conflict remains common (Ploch, 2007, p.2): the 
International Crisis Group estimates that approximately 8000 Nigerians were 
killed in sectarian clashes between 1999 and 2002 alone, and a further 6000 may 
have been the targets of ethnic or religious killings (Ploch, 2007, p.6). 
Furthermore, China’s involvement in the continent has risen exponentially in the 
2000s as its appetite for natural resources, new markets, and political support 
has grown. The U.S. relationship with Nigeria could be extrapolated to other 
African states which share similar characteristics such as abundant valuable 
natural resources, high incidences of terrorist and sectarian violence and interest 
from other countries like China. This could include places like Angola, South 
Sudan, Gabon, Algeria and Niger.  
 
The main argument of this thesis is that United States policy in Africa has become 
increasingly securitized since 2001 due to three key securitizing factors. Prior to 
this U.S. engagement was for the most part restricted to the economic realm, 
particularly the energy industry as well as development and aid (although as will 
be discussed, even then national interest always took precedence over other 
needs). Since 2001 however, there has been a marked shift towards emphasising 
the security and defense side of the relationship. Trade and development issues 
are still important of course, but there is evidence that they are being eclipsed by 
the needs and objectives of the Pentagon and the U.S. national security 
establishment. The creation of the United States Africa Command (AFRICOM) in 
2007 at a time when the U.S. military presence in other parts of the world was 
being cut back and the Department of State and Agency for International 
Development (USAID) were suffering from budget cuts is indicative of this shift.  
There are three factors which I will argue contributed to this new securitization. 
The first, oil dependency, has been a constant concern of the U.S. since the 1970s, 
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but achieved a new sense of urgency in the 2000s. The terrorist attacks on the 
U.S. in 2001 and subsequent upheaval in the Middle East caused by the U.S. 
invasions of Afghanistan and Iraq cemented the importance of diversifying oil 
suppliers to reduce dependence on oil from the Arabian Gulf. Countries like 
Nigeria offered the capacity to balance out the decline in Iraqi oil production and 
provide a long-term alternative if their capacity to produce oil could be 
protected. This leads into the second securitizing factor, that of terrorism and 
intra-state conflict. The 9/11 attacks launched the Global War on Terror (GWOT) 
and highlighted how a small group of violent extremists on the other side of the 
world could pose a very real threat to the United States. It also showed how 
failed and weak states could harbour not only terrorists but other violent 
insurgent groups that could threaten the stability of the state as well as the wider 
region. In Nigeria, terrorist attacks by Boko Haram and Ansaru as well as the 
guerrilla campaigns waged by groups like the Niger Delta People’s Volunteer 
Force (NDPVF) and the Movement for the Emancipation of the Niger Delta 
(MEND) threaten its cohesion as a country and the stability of the wider West 
African region.  This means that Nigeria has been caught up the GWOT and, as 
such, much engagement with the country has been shaped by the security 
concerns of the Department of Defense.  
 
The third securitizing factor at play in the U.S.-Nigeria relationship (and also in 
wider U.S.-Africa relations) is the rise of China. As China’s economic weight and 
international influence has increased, it has become more heavily involved in 
Africa, particularly in countries like Nigeria which can provide the natural 
resources it needs to maintain its economic growth. Chinese investment in 
Nigeria’s energy industry, combined with its willingness to sell arms and provide 
military training, has engendered a sense of threat in the U.S. The threat is that 
China may be attempting to “lock-in” resources like oil for its own use and 
potentially use these resources as an “oil weapon”, as the OPEC states did in the 
1970s. Given the importance of oil not only to the U.S. but its allies, this is 
deemed a threat which justifies the expansion of military activity in Nigeria and 
other African states in order to protect U.S. interests and counter China’s 
influence.    
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Why should we care about these developments? Why does it matter if the U.S. 
military is exerting greater control over U.S. Africa policy? The reasons we should 
care can be divided into three main categories: development and governance 
issues, human rights concerns, and environmental problems. A focus on security 
issues rather than development or governance problems only serves to prolong 
underdevelopment and in the case of many countries, worsen the situation by 
diverting much-needed resources into the security sector. Furthermore, most 
would agree that the United States’ involvement in the Middle East has done little 
to promote human rights values or build politically stable regimes: most would in 
fact argue that it has been counterproductive in these respects. A similar 
outcome is to be expected if U.S. policy follows the same path in Africa. 
Furthermore, the overwhelming focus on oil as an energy resource makes it hard 
to develop alternative clean energy solutions that would be better for the 
environment. This point will be returned to in section 2. 
 
The thesis follows the following structure. First, I will present the literature on 
securitization theory and how it relates to the U.S. engagement in Africa. I will 
then examine the three factors which I will argue have contributed to the 
securitization of U.S. policy towards Africa: oil, terrorism, and the rise of China. I 
will then present some of the arguments why such a securitization might be a 
bad thing, particularly in the context of development policy. Following this 
general examination, I will turn to a more in-depth case study of these three 
factors in relation to U.S. engagement with Nigeria, focusing on how the 
relationship has changed, in particular since 2001. Next I will discuss the 
negative aspects of the securitization of U.S. policy in relation to Nigeria 
specifically, and what an alternative policy would look like before presenting 
some final conclusions.  
 
Theoretical Framework: Securitization Theory 
This section will outline the theoretical framework used in this thesis, that of 
securitization theory. It will then provide background and contextual information 
about the securitization of Africa in U.S. foreign policy, focusing on the three 
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factors that I argue have driven this transformation (oil dependency and energy 
security, the rise of China, and terrorism). 
 
The key theoretical framework I will employ in this thesis is that of securitization 
theory. It is a theory which attempts to understand how and why certain issues, 
states or groups of people come to be deemed security threats and what effects 
this has. It is applicable to my thesis question as it allows me to examine what 
effect the security-oil nexus has had on U.S.-Africa relations and more specifically 
the U.S.-Nigeria relationship by using the lens of securitization as a way to assess 
how the relationship has changed, why, and what the possible implications of this 
are. 
 
Securitization theory, associated with the Copenhagen School of political theory, 
was formulated in the 1990s as a middle ground between traditional security 
studies (which argued that security should only be concerned with war, military 
power and the state) and critical security studies (which wanted to widened the 
concept of security to issues beyond war and the state, and argued that security 
should be emancipatory) (Vultee, 2010, p.34). Securitization theory aims to 
examine how and why some issues become security issues and others do not, and 
what this “securitization” actually does. Something becomes a security issue 
when it poses (or is presented as posing) an existential threat to a particular 
referent object (traditionally the state). Any public issue can be located on a 
spectrum ranging from non-politicized to politicized to securitized; securitization 
is a more extreme form of politicization (Buzan et al., 1998, p.23). Exactly where 
an issue is placed on the spectrum varies from state to state and across time. 
Successful securitization involves three steps: 1) the identification of an 
existential threat; 2) emergency action; and 3) a change in inter-unit relations 
due to the breaking of rules (Taureck, 2006, p.55). When an issue has been 
securitized, it means that a political actor with sufficient standing (securitization 
is closely linked to power (Taureck, 2006, p.55)) has presented it to the relevant 
audience as an existential threat that places the “physical, cultural, or social 
health of the community” in danger (Vultee, 2010, p.33). However, simply 
because an issue has been presented as an existential threat does not necessarily 
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mean that such a threat genuinely exists. The discourses of security from which 
securitization arises are not objective assessments of threat, but are rather the 
“products of historical structures and processes, of struggles for power within 
the state, of conflicts between the societal groupings that inhabit states and the 
interests that besiege them” (Lipschutz, 1998, p.5). It has been debated whether 
a disruption in oil supply, for example, truly counts as an existential threat to the 
state, but what matters is that it has been presented as such and generated 
accompanying extraordinary actions because of its historical association with 
war and national security (Buzan et al., 1998, p.24).  
 
That is why I believe that securitization theory is a fruitful avenue for exploring 
the policies of the United States towards securing oil in Africa: when it comes to 
theorizing resources in international relations, much work is hampered by 
disagreement over whether threats to the supply of resources like oil are truly 
security threats. By employing securitization theory, the question is shifted from 
whether oil supply is a security issue for the United States to how and with what 
effect it has been presented as one. Furthermore, securitization theory offers an 
avenue to examine new sectors in security studies, in this case energy, which 
more traditional security theories (primarily realism and its variants) are ill-
suited for. Security threats have traditionally been portrayed as mainly military 
in nature because of their potential to completely overthrow the existing political 
entity of the state. If political or economic means, however, could be employed to 
bring about a similar threat to the survival of the state as an independent, 
sovereign political unit, they will also be security threats (Waever 1998).  In this 
thesis I plan to employ a slightly altered securitization theory than that originally 
laid out by Buzan, Wæver and de Wilde (Buzan et al., 1998), following the 
suggestions of Matt McDonald and Rita Abrahamsen.  
 
Abrahamsen suggests that “the process of securitization is […] better understood 
as gradual and incremental, and importantly an issue can be placed on the 
security continuum without necessarily ever reaching the category of existential 
threat” (Abrahamsen, 2005, p.59). I believe that this will be a more useful way to 
think of securitization theory, as in the case of U.S. engagement in Africa there 
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has been no single defining moment where developments on the continent 
suddenly became portrayed as an existential threat, yet I will argue that it has 
clearly been placed on the security agenda. Similarly McDonald has argued that 
securitization theory is too narrow, and would be more useful if certain aspects 
were broadened. First, he argued that the form of the act constructing security 
was too limited to the speech of dominant actors, excluding other forms of 
representation (such as visual images) and actors who may not be deemed 
institutionally legitimate but who still have a stake in contesting security. In the 
case of oil production in Africa, for instance, the very vocal calls by international 
oil companies for greater security in the Niger Delta, the Gulf of Guinea and other 
oil producing regions have played a significant role in placing oil on the security 
agenda of not only African states but the companies’ home governments. 
Secondly, he argued that the context of securitizing acts is defined too narrowly, 
focusing only on the moment of intervention and not addressing the potential for 
security to be constructed over time. Again, this point is especially relevant in the 
case of African oil, as the shift towards seeing it as a security issue does not have 
one dramatic, defining moment, but can be traced over a number of years.  
(McDonald, 2008, p.564).  
 
So what actually happens when an issue moves into the realm of security 
politics? Security issues are traditionally defined by their capacity to pose a 
threat to survival, therefore the use of extraordinary measures that go beyond 
the normal range of political procedures is justified (Buzan et al., 1998, p.21). 
Such extraordinary measures may include the use of fast-track decision-making 
and legislation, secrecy, a lack of opportunities for deliberation or public input, or 
the use of military and/or security agencies rather than civilian actors. 
Securitization institutionalizes speed, which puts into question “the viability of 
deliberation and a contest of opinion” and supports “strengthening executive-
centred government” and suppressing dissent (Roe, 2012, p.251). For this 
reason, securitization has negative connotations for many scholars. As Roe 
writes:  
“Rather than debate and deliberation, securitization calls for silence and 
speed. Security policy is the privilege of the elite, and scrutiny is neither 
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feasible nor desirable […] Securitization’s negativeness, therefore, lies in 
its disruption – or indeed complete abandonment – of open and 
accountable government. In other words, securitization is bad for 
democracy.” (Roe, 2012, p.252) 
This point is especially pertinent for countries like Nigeria, where democracy is 
still relatively recent and fragile.  In this context, securitization has taken to form 
of a reliance on military agencies and resources rather than civilian actors.  
 
Wæver also argues that securitizing an issue does not necessarily result in 
greater effectiveness or optimal outcomes (Roe, 2012, p.253). National security 
policy making tends to focus on short-term problems requiring short-term 
solutions that can be implemented rapidly, and is therefore unsuitable for issues 
which require greater latitude, such as development, poverty, and environmental 
problems (Roe, 2012, p.253). This does not mean that every issue will be better 
addressed if it is not securitized: judging whether or not securitization is positive 
or negative depends heavily on the issue in question. Some adhere to the thesis 
that if the security of the many rather than the few is improved, securitization is a 
positive thing (Roe, 2012, p.253). As will be discussed in a later section, however, 
this is demonstrably not the case in Africa.  
 
This section has presented securitization theory as it will be applied in this 
thesis. Securitization is the process by which an issue in the public domain is 
presented as an existential security threat to the referent object, in most cases 
the state. This has the effect of justifying the use of extraordinary measures and 
bypassing the normal rules of politics to combat the threat. In the case of the U.S., 
Africa and Nigeria, the issue of ensuring the continued production of oil has 
become a security issue, a process which has been taking place in small 
increments since the 1970s but which has accelerated since 2001. The following 
section will examine this process in greater detail.  
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The Securitization of Africa: oil, terrorism and China 
The securitization of Africa was a gradual process that spanned the Cold War. 
Throughout the 1940s Africa was barely on the radar of the U.S. and was 
excluded from the U.S. military command structure. In 1952 several countries in 
North Africa were added to the responsibilities of the European Command due to 
their historic relationship with Europe, but the majority of the continent, 
including Nigeria, was not incorporated into any geographic command at all until 
1960, when the Cold War competition for influence over the newly independent 
African states prompted the U.S. to assign responsibility for sub-Saharan Africa to 
the Atlantic Command (LANTCOM). Responsibility shifted once again in 1962 to 
the newly created Strike Command (STRICOM) until its responsibility for Africa 
was removed. This left sub-Saharan Africa once again outside the U.S. military 
command structure until 1983 when Cold War priorities once again drew 
attention to Africa (Ploch, 2008, p.12).   
 
After the end of the Cold War, Africa gained an increased strategic importance to 
the United States for three reasons: the Global War on Terror; fears of an 
impending energy crisis; and China’s growing presence on the continent (Keenan, 
2008, p.16). In accordance with the version of securitization presented by 
Abrahamsen and McDonald, this securitization did not occur overnight. It has 
instead been a slow process which Jeremy Keenan argues began to gather speed 
in 1997. This year saw the founding of the Project for the New American Century 
(PNAC), a  neo-conservative think tank that promoted the use of U.S. military 
might abroad in order to ensure that the U.S. maintained its position of global 
leadership. Its members wound up in several key positions in the administration 
of George Bush Jr and its ideals came to heavily influence the government’s 
policies, especially in relation to national security and the Iraq War. Its views 
were bolstered as in 1997 the level of U.S. dependence on foreign oil reached the 
“psychologically critical level of 50%” (Keenan, 2010, p.28). This gave PNAC 
ammunition to make energy security into a national security issue, prompting 
Bush to establish a National Energy Policy Development (NEPD) Group under 
Vice-President Dick Cheney immediately upon taking office in 2001. The report 
produced by the NEPD Group made dire predictions about the future of U.S. 
energy security, projecting that energy use would continue to soar while oil 
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output from Saudi Arabia appeared to be plateauing. Oil was defined by the Bush 
administration as a “strategic national interest: and thus was a resource which 
justified the use of military force to control” (Keenan, 2010, p.29). Identifying 
continued reliance on Saudi oil as a national security threat, the report 
recommended diversifying the sources of America’s oil supply. President Bush 
stated in 2006 that is was his goal to “to replace more than 75 percent of our oil 
imports from the Middle East by 2025” in order to enhance U.S. energy security 
(Ploch, 2008, p.14). Sub-Saharan Africa was singled out as a key future source of 
oil for the U.S., particularly states in West Africa and the Gulf of Guinea: in 2001 
the U.S. was already importing 14% of its oil from Africa, rising to 22% in 2006 
(Keenan, 2010, p.28). In 2004, included in the list of Pentagon priorities in Africa 
was assuring “access to strategic resources”, alongside more traditional concerns 
such as disrupting terrorist activity and stopping the spread of WMDs (Keenan, 
2010, pp.32-33). Because Africa had re-entered America’s worldview as an 
important source of oil, anything which threatened its capacity to fulfil this role 
was dangerous and perceived as a potential threat to U.S. national security.  
 
The National Intelligence Council’s Global Trends 2030 report placed a number 
of African countries, including Nigeria, at a risk of state failure given the range of 
challenges they face1 and their relatively limited capacity to deal with them. 
Because of this fragility and the potential for destabilizing groups to take root, 
the U.S. military is becoming more active in the region, primarily through 
AFRICOM (Varhola and Sheperd, 2013, p.329). AFRICOM was set up in 2007 
(coincidentally the same year that U.S. oil imports from Africa peaked (Brown, 
2013, p.45)) and reached full operating capability as a stand-alone command in 
2008 under General William E. Ward, replacing the U.S. European Command 
(EUCOM) as the military command responsible for Africa. This reflected a shift in 
strategic thinking motivated by the recognition that Africa, with its vast oil 
deposits, was a tactical prize that could not be left to be lost to state failure. 
EUCOM’s resources were being stretched due to the stability and security 
challenges presented by Africa: in 2006, EUCOM’s staff were spending more than 
                                                             
1 Such as poverty, corruption, sectarian violence etc.  
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half their time on Africa issues, a huge increase from just three years before 
(Ploch, 2011, p.2).  
 
AFRICOM’s modus operandi is to advance regional peace and security, and to do 
this the command focuses on three main areas “(1) countering violent extremist 
organizations (VEOs); (2) supporting maritime security and countering illicit 
trafficking; and (3) strengthening African defense capabilities” (Varhola and 
Sheperd, 2013, p.327). Its overarching goal on its creation was to “promote a 
stable and secure African environment in support of U.S. foreign policy” through 
military-to-military programs and operations (Ploch, 2008, p.2 n.3). Stability 
operations are a priority for the new command on par with combat operations, 
due to the recognition that instability and failing states threaten the interests of 
the U.S. and its allies: “America is now threatened less by conquering states than 
we are by failing ones” (Ploch, 2008, p.5). In 2009 the Obama administration 
requested a significant increase for security assistance to African countries (such 
as the Foreign Military Financing (FMF) programme and the International 
Military Education and Training (IMET) programme) as well as for AFRICOM’s 
operations (Keenan, 2010, p.39). An increase in funding was also requested for 
counterterrorism operations in Africa through the Peacekeeping Operations 
programme, including increases in funding for the Trans-Sahara 
Counterterrorism Partnership and the East Africa Regional Strategic Initiative 
(Keenan, 2010, p.39). AFRICOM also works to improve maritime security and 
protect the “free flow of global commerce” (Varhola and Sheperd, 2013, pp.327-
28), supporting the strategic objective of enhancing economic growth, trade and 
investment.  
 
The United States military has also been acquiring facilities such as air bases and 
ports since the 1990s, and today has access to “lily-pad” bases in a number of 
countries including Botswana, Kenya, Namibia, São Tomé and Príncipe, Sierra 
Leone, Tunisia, Uganda, and Zambia that are used to support counter-terrorism 
operations and protect sea lanes (Ploch, 2008, p.9). The base on São Tomé y 
Príncipe has been described as similar to Diego Garcia, the U.S. facility that has 
enabled it to control and defend Middle Eastern oil supplies since the Cold War. 
America has also investigated the possibility of building similar facilities in 
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Nigeria, Gabon, Algeria, Ghana, and Mali (Vine, 2012). In Niger, a drone base for 
dispatching Predator drones was established in March 2013, along with an 
agreement with the Niger government providing judicial protection for U.S. 
troops stationed in the country. This gives the U.S. military an important strategic 
foothold in Western Africa, as Niger borders the unstable, volatile states of Mali, 
Nigeria, and Libya (Whitlock, 2013). 
 
The gradual securitization of African issues by the United States was reflective of 
the recognition of non-traditional security threats in the 1990s. As the Cold War 
ended, it became obvious that inter-state war was no longer the primary threat 
facing states. Instead issues such as energy security, terrorism and failed states, 
and fears about shifts in the global balance of power came to the attention of the 
defense establishment, leading to increasingly securitized engagement with 
African countries culminating with the creation of AFRICOM in 2007. These 
factors, which contributed to the securitization of Africa, will be considered in 
greater detail in the next section. All three are factors on their own merit, but the 
rise of China and terrorism are also closely interlinked with energy security, and 
I believe it is this connection which has made the situation in Africa appear to be 
a greater threat to the interests of the United States.   
Energy security  
The first factor contributing to the securitization of Africa in United States foreign 
policy is energy security, or more specifically, oil security. Energy security has 
traditionally been defined as “the availability of sufficient supply at affordable 
prices” (Luft and Korin, 2013). For the most part this refers to oil simply because 
oil is the most widely used energy source in both the economic and military 
realms, and also because oil is the one energy source that has historically been 
subject to the most insecurity.   
 
Although states have long recognised the importance of a secure and affordable 
supply of oil to their national security, in theoretical terms International 
Relations scholars did not seriously consider such “non-traditional” security 
issues as national security threats until after the Cold War. During the 1980s, 
nuclear weapons, the arms race and deterrence theory dominated discourses of 
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security, but after the Cold War ended there was a growing awareness that “war 
was disappearing, or in some cases had disappeared, as an option in relations 
amongst a substantial group of states” (Buzan, 1997, p.6).  At this time Security 
Studies underwent a schism of sorts between those who believed Security 
Studies should remain concerned only with military issues, those who argued for 
a widening of the security agenda to include things such as energy security, and 
those who questioned the entire conceptualization of security at its roots (Buzan, 
1997, p.5). Traditional Security Studies scholars argued that widening the 
security agenda by including things like energy, human rights, poverty and so 
forth only served to make the meaning of security incoherent (Buzan, 1997, p.5). 
However, things that had traditionally been seen as “low politics”, such as the 
economy and the environment, were becoming increasingly securitized whether 
scholars agreed or not (Buzan, 1997, p.7). With regards to the economy, for 
instance, securitization was spurred by factors such as the relative decline of the 
United States in the economic realm, the increasingly liberalized nature of the 
global economy, and a growing dependence on imported oil (Buzan, 1997, p.7). 
These things raised concerns about the capacity of the state to “maintain 
independent capability for military production in a global market” and the 
possibility of dependency (such as oil) being exploited for foreign powers 
(Buzan, 1997, p.8). With regards to these new security issues the state was no 
longer the only relevant actor, although it mostly remains central. New “referent 
objects for security and sources of threat” emerged, such as firms, communities, 
and terrorist groups (Buzan, 1997, p.12).  
 
The security of an affordable oil supply became linked to national security during 
the First World War, when the British and American navies begun to transition 
from coal to oil as a primary source of power. By the time the Second World War 
erupted in 1939, every navy on the world was dependent on oil, as were the 
majority of land forces. As soon as conventional military forces became reliant on 
oil in order to operate effectively on the battlefield2, obtaining and maintaining 
access to a secure supply of oil became a national security issue. Britain, for 
                                                             
2 Although the U.S. military in particular (having recognised this) is undertaking research into 
how it can reduce dependence on oil. No realistic alternative has been found thus far, however. 
See Closson, S. The military and energy: Moving the United States beyond oil. Energy Policy. 
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instance, had large coal supplies of its own, but had to negotiate access to oil 
from foreign powers (Dahl, 2001, p.51). It had to devise means of securing a 
steady supply in order to avoid repeat incidents of the oil shortages in 1917 
which severely constrained the mobility and usefulness of the Royal Navy (Dahl, 
2001, p.55). Because most states, like Britain in World War One, are not self-
sufficient in oil and cannot take for granted the ability to buy oil freely from 
global markets, especially during wartime, expectations about military and 
essential fuel needs in wartime influences countries strategic calculations and 
thus their foreign policies (Kelanic, 2013, p.6). During World War Two, for 
instance, both Japan and Germany had to tailor their foreign policies and war 
strategies to secure oil supplies: Germany pursued alliances with Europe’s two 
largest oil producers at the time (Rumania and Russia) while Japan was driven 
into invading the oil-rich Dutch East Indies (Kelanic, 2013, p.1).  
 
Oil did not, however, diminish in importance just because the war was over, both 
due to the military competition of the Cold War and oil’s increasingly obvious 
economic importance. In the post-war years oil became essential to the 
functioning of a modern economy, making it vital not only for military security 
and the waging of war, but also national economic security. Those states that can 
retain access to adequate supplies of energy will flourish, whereas those that fail 
to do so will face hardship and decline.  The drive to secure foreign oil supplies 
had roots in immediate post-war years. The United States ceased to be a net 
exporter of oil in 1947, when growing consumption outpaced domestic oil 
production for the first time, creating lasting issues of supply and turning the U.S. 
into a net importer of oil (Ross, 2013). Although the U.S. was able to act as a 
swing producer for a time by limiting production in the East Texan oil fields, in 
1970 production finally peaked and the only countries left with spare capacity 
were the OPEC nations (Ross, 2013). After the numerous interruptions to oil 
supply of the 1950s and 1960s, and when combined with the 1973 oil embargo, 
the stage was set for the Carter Doctrine of 1980. This explicitly stated that 
defending the flow of oil from the Persian Gulf was a U.S. vital interest and that 
any attempt to interfere with the flow would be met with all necessary force 
(Klare, 2001).  
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There have been several significant incidents between the end of the Second 
World War and the dawn of the 21st century which have contributed to the 
securitization of oil by highlighting to states how easily global supply can be 
disrupted and how severe the consequences can be. The 1953 British embargo of 
Iranian oil, the 1956 Suez Crisis, and the Arab oil embargo following the Six Day 
War in 1967 all highlighted the necessity of keeping global oil flowing and 
preventing disruptions to production or transportation (Ross, 2013). The second 
Arab oil embargo was another major turning point in the securitization of oil. In 
1973 the Arab members of OPEC voted to raise their benchmark oil price3 by 
70%. Over the next few months the Arab producers cut production and stopped 
shipments of oil to the United States and other countries that supported Israel in 
the Yom Kippur War: by 1974 the price of oil had quadrupled, hitting oil 
importers with enormous fuel costs and sparking economic recessions. The 
embargo was especially harmful as U.S. oil production had peaked in 1970, and it 
was no longer able to boost production at home to make up for international 
shortfalls (Ross, 2013). The Gulf War in 1991 was another important moment. 
Most accounts of the Gulf War argue that the main reason Saddam Hussein 
invaded Kuwait was because of oil. Similarly, one of the most cited reasons that 
the United States retaliated was also because of oil: had Iraq gained control over 
Kuwait’s oil it would have had the leverage to force Saudi Arabia and smaller 
Arab states into cutting their oil production and increasing world oil prices. 
Higher oil prices would have had two effects on the U.S.: a larger import bill and 
depressed economic activity due to higher oil prices and similar recessions in 
other countries. Even though the U.S. at the time only imported around five 
percent of its oil from the Gulf, the world market as a whole was far more 
dependent on Gulf oil. Economic interdependence meant that rising prices which 
hurt other countries economically would also harm the U.S (Nye Jr, 1991).  
 
Interestingly, until the 1990s most of the threats to oil supply stemmed from 
state actions: it is only towards the year 2000 that non-state actors became the 
primary threat.  As will become clear, non-state actors are one of the key factors 
                                                             
3 The price of a particular crude oil (such as West Texas Intermediate or Dubai) which sets a 
reference price for buyers and sellers. 
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in the securitization of Africa as they pose the main threat to oil supply on the 
continent. 
 
Even though the United States’ dependence on imported oil may today be 
declining once again thanks to increases in domestic production of shale oil, it 
still imports more in “absolute and relative terms” than it did thirty years ago 
(Johnson, 2014). Therefore security policy is still concerned with protecting oil, 
especially in key producing regions such as the Middle East, as a severe 
disruption to the flow of oil would destabilize world economy given that for the 
most part the rest of the world still depends on imported oil. A reduction in oil 
supply without a parallel reduction in demand would drive up world oil prices 
for everyone, regardless of supplier (Luft and Korin, 2013). As the world’s only 
superpower with relations spanning the globe, the U.S. has relied on the Gulf oil 
producers, particularly Saudi Arabia with its excess production capacity, to keep 
fuelling the global economy and maintain stable oil prices. So even if the U.S. oil 
imports are not as high as they once were, other countries, especially in U.S. allies 
like Japan and South Korea, remain as dependent as ever. The U.S. will therefore 
remain committed to ensuring the safe transport of oil from key producing 
regions. Furthermore, despite technological revolutions which have increased 
production of shale oil in the U.S., the long-term viability of shale oil production is 
not yet certain due to the high production costs and the rapid depletion rate of 
shale wells. The sudden production surge has by no means made the U.S. energy 
independent: in 2013 it still imported approximately 40 percent of its oil needs 
(Rahman, 2013). On top of this, despite advances in discovering alternative 
energy sources, such as wind and solar, oil is still the most widely used energy 
source (making up approximately 34 percent of world energy usage in 2010) and 
is likely to remain a central energy source for many decades to come (EIA, 2013a, 
p.2). A U.S. army official, Lieutenant Colonel Daniel L. Davis, argued at a 
conference in December 2013 that despite the resurgence in U.S. oil production, 
the situation is not as rosy as it appears. An International Energy Agency (IEA) 
report found that despite an increase of some 200 percent in investment in the 
oil industry, oil production has only risen by 12 percent since 2000 (Ahmed, 
2014). The IEA also argued that the emergence of shale oil had not changed the 
long-term picture of oil’s future (Klare, 2014).  
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Finding new sources of oil has therefore been of great importance, and Africa has 
emerged as one such source. Oil (and gas) exploration is taking place or is 
planned in at least 51 out of 54 of the countries on the continent – by 2011 Africa 
had 132.4 billion barrels of proven oil reserves, an 154 percent increase over the 
1980 estimate (Brown, 2013, p.xi). The United States Geological Survey estimates 
that West Africa alone contains around 120 billion barrels of undiscovered oil 
(Brown, 2013, p.3). Because of this, Africa has emerged as a crucial player in the 
diversification strategies of the major economies, especially China, Japan, and 
Europe (Brown, 2013, p.xii). In 2002, thanks to rising demand for oil in Asia and 
volatility in the Middle East, President Bush called West African oil a “strategic 
national interest”, a securitizing label that presents a justification for “the use of 
force to secure and defend such interests if necessary”. At the time, militants in 
the Niger Delta had been waging a months-long sabotage campaign that had 
reduced Nigeria’s daily oil exports by a quarter and contributed to a rise in global 
oil prices. The collapse of Nigeria was judged by the National Intelligence Council 
in the U.S. to be the most serious threat facing Africa as it could produce a 
domino effect and destabilise the entire continent (Motlagh, 2006).  Furthermore, 
although African oil today may not be as vital to America’s energy security as it is 
to, say, China’s, it is still important to the United States’ broader national security. 
Africa is the source of huge trade and investment opportunities for America, 
including in the chronically underfunded oil and gas sectors. Huge amounts of 
American money have already been invested in the energy sectors of 22 
countries in Africa and this amount is likely to grow (Brown, 2013, p.xiii). 
Terrorism 
“Islamic militancy in Africa is part of a broader, global ideological current. In some 
cases, this includes links to like-minded organizations outside Africa (Østebø, 2012, 
p.3).” 
The second factor which has contributed to the securitization of Africa is 
terrorism. Terrorism has become the overriding security concerns of the United 
States since 2001, not just because of the threat posed to the U.S. homeland but 
also because of the danger posed to the stability of key oil-producing states, 
which more often than not are already relatively unstable. Although there is no 
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legal or academic consensus on the exact definition of terrorism, widely agreed 
characteristics include the use of violence, or the threat of violence, to intimidate 
or coerce a population or government in the pursuit of political aims. Using this 
definition, terrorist groups can include Boko Haram and al-Shabaab, which use 
violence to coerce the government into creating an Islamic state, as well as 
groups like MEND, which uses violence to change government policy regarding 
oil production.  
Since the 1990s and especially since the September 11 terrorist attacks in 2001, 
weak and underdeveloped states have been increasingly portrayed as security 
threats to the world beyond their borders. They are viewed as potential breeding 
grounds for terrorism, insurgency and instability that can spill out and affect the 
lives of people on the other side of the world, as Osama Bin Laden’s use of 
Afghanistan as a staging ground for the 9/11 attacks demonstrated 
(Abrahamsen, 2004, p.678). In 2012 over 15,000 people were killed in 
approximately 8500 terrorist attacks around the world. The majority of these 
attacks took place in just eight countries, including Nigeria. The other countries 
were also all located in the developing world (Hansen et al., 2013, p.4). 
Statements which link Africa to terrorism have a “potentially profound impact on 
how policies towards Africa are formulated and implemented” (Abrahamsen, 
2004, p.680) and demonstrate the extent to which Africa has become securitized 
in United States foreign policy. In 2003 for example, the Sahara was described a 
“swamp of terror” and a “terrorist infestation” by the Deputy Commander of 
EUCOM (which had responsibility for much of Africa at the time). Terrorism and 
insurgency push already weak states even closer to the point of collapse (as with 
Somalia, where American forces have deployed for the first time since 1993 in an 
attempt to curtail the influence of al-Shabaab (Whitlock, 2014)), endangering 
wider regional stability and threatening the free flow of oil and other important 
natural resources.  
 
The launching of the GWOT following the September 11 terrorist attacks in 2001 
provided ample opportunity for the incorporation of regions of the world under a 
national security rubric, even if they were not directly related to the GWOT (such 
as Africa). The emphasis and intensity of U.S. engagement with countries on the 
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continent changed, as will become evident when the case of Nigeria is examined 
in greater detail in the next section. Evidence of this began to emerge in 2002, 
when the U.S. Central Command (CENTCOM) moved several of its facilities from 
Saudi Arabia to Camp Lemonier in Djibouti in East Africa. Camp Lemonier thus 
became the main base of the Combined Joint Task Force in the Horn of Africa 
(which is made up of approximately 1500 military and civilian personnel) as well 
as the East Africa Counterterrorism Initiative (Keenan, 2008, p.17). In early 2004 
500 anti-terror troops were deployed to Mauritania and Mali alongside as well as 
400 Army rangers in Chad and Niger (Keenan, 2008, p.17). These troops were 
deployed under the auspices of the Pan-Sahel Initiative (PSI), which would later 
expand into the Trans-Sahara Counterterrorism Initiative (TSCI) and today 
involves eleven nations: Algeria, Burkina Faso, Libya, Morocco, Tunisia, Chad, 
Mali, Mauritania, Niger, Nigeria, and Senegal.  
 
In 2006 as part of the FY2006 National Defense Authorization Act (NDAA), 
Section 1206 for the first time provided the Secretary of Defense with the 
authority to “train and equip foreign military forces and foreign maritime 
security forces” for the purposes of carrying out counterterrorism operations 
and supporting military and stability operations carried out by the U.S. armed 
forces. Prior to this, the Department of Defense only trained and equipped 
foreign militaries under the authority of the Department of State: Section 1206 
was the first time responsibility for this had been placed solely with the 
Department of Defense (Serafino, 2013, p.1). Some government officials believe 
the Section 1206 has been used as a replacement for the State Department’s 
Foreign Military Financing (FMF) programs, especially given the insufficient FMF 
funds available to meet all foreign security assistance needs (Serafino, 2013, p.4).  
Furthermore, some have argued that Section 1206 gives the Department of 
Defense unwarranted influence over U.S. foreign policy and diplomacy as well as 
weakening “congressional oversight” and “human rights protections”. From this 
perspective programs such as Section 1206 indicate a creeping militarization of 
U.S foreign policy that is harmful to U.S. foreign relations and the U.S. image with 
foreign populations (Serafino, 2013, p.17). The bombing of the United Nations 
headquarters in Abuja by Boko Haram, for example, was in part justified by 
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referencing the U.S. collaboration with the Nigerian security forces, which were 
targeted due to their heavy-handed campaign against the group’s members in the 
north (Ploch, 2012, p.15).  
 
Africa received the second greatest amount of Section 1206 funding in FY2011 
and FY2012, receiving $158 million compared to $71 million for the Middle East 
and South Asia. Four of the largest individual recipients were also from Africa, all 
receiving over $20 million each: Mauritania, Yemen, Uganda and Burundi 
(Serafino, 2013, pp.5-6). This money covered things such as “CT training, aircraft 
modernization, mine detection, logistics support, communications enhancement, 
vehicles, and maritime equipment” (Serafino, 2013, p.7). The amount of Section 
1206 funding allocated to Africa has been much greater than the FMF funding 
allocated to that same region. In FY2009, for instance, Africa received just 2 
percent of FMF funding ($8.3 million out of $4.6 billion) compared with 14 
percent ($48.7 million out of $339.9 million) of Section 1206 total funding 
(Serafino, 2013, p.16).  
 
The threat of terrorism destabilising an already fragile continent and disrupting 
the free flow of oil, even more important due to the upheaval in the Middle East, 
has contributed to the securitization of the United States’ relationship with 
Africa, particularly countries which are deemed to be especially vulnerable to 
terrorism or other forms of violent insurgency. This has manifested in the form of 
increased military aid, the provision of military equipment, and enhanced 
military training. 
The China Factor 
The third factor which has contributed to the securitization of Africa has been the 
rise of China. Since Deng Xiaoping’s economic reforms in the 1970s and 1980s, 
China has emerged as an enormously important and influential international 
actor. China is already the world’s second largest economy, and by most accounts 
will overtake the United States in the not too distant future (BBC, 2013). With a 
growing economy comes an increasingly voracious appetite for raw materials, 
especially oil, most of which can be sourced in the developing world. Since the 
1990s, China has been working to increase its diplomatic and economic influence 
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in these countries, using its significant financial resources to fund infrastructure 
projects, resource development and investments by Chinese companies in some 
of the world’s poorest countries. Such financial assistance in Africa has by and 
large gone to just four countries: Nigeria, Angola, Sudan and Ethiopia, all of which 
are significant oil producers (Winton, 2013, p.12). Five of China’s top seven 
African trading partners are also oil exporters: Nigeria, Angola, Libya, Algeria and 
Congo (Brazzaville) (Brown, 2013, p.62).  
China’s presence in Africa is certainly expanding rapidly. Two-way trade rose 
from US$1 billion in 2000 to over US$50 billion by 2006, and in the same period 
China’s share of Africa’s exports rose from 2.6 percent to over 9.3 percent (Alden, 
2007, p.8). The World Bank estimated that China’s investment in roads, power, 
railways and other infrastructural projects Africa rose from under $1 billion a 
year from 2001-2003 to over $7 billion in 2006 alone (Tattersall, 2008). China’s 
activities in Africa have been focused on resource acquisition and commercial 
ventures, a marked change from the ideologically-based engagement of the 
1960s and 1970s (Alden, 2007, pp.8-9). Besides economic investment, China has 
also been making arms sales to Africa that were around $500 million per annum 
between 2003 and 2006, making it Africa’s third largest arms supplier (Hofstedt, 
2009, p.84). Although China is not the largest arms supplier to Africa, it has 
actively targeted pariah regimes such as Sudan and Zimbabwe while they are 
under sanctions by the U.S. and the European Union (Alden, 2007, p.25), gaining 
influence by selling to countries that others will not. Between 2006 and 2010 
Nigeria was one of the top five countries to whom China sold arms, alongside 
important Chinese allies like Pakistan, Bangladesh, Iran and Venezuela (Mayer 
and Wübbeke, 2013, p.279). Sudan has received F-6 and F-7 fighter aircraft, T-62 
light tanks, anti-aircraft systems, and trucks, among other weapons.  Angola has 
ordered eight SU-77 fighter aircraft, and Algeria has received C-802 ship-to-ship 
missiles from China. The China North Industries Corporation (NORINCO) 
explicitly stated that it aims to take advantage of the “spillover effect” of military 
trade” to increase access to oil for its subsidiary, ZhenHua Oil, in places such as 
Angola (NORINCO). 
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At the same time, however, U.S. arms sales to Africa have also been increasing, 
from US$39.4 million in 2001 to over US$87 million in 2005. Funding for military 
assistance has also increased, doubling from $296 million in 1998-2001 to $597 
million in 2002-2005. 
 
This increased economic and military interest in Africa began to develop in 1993, 
when China transitioned from an oil exporter to an oil importer. In 1996 Jiang 
Zemin’s visit firmly emphasised that future relations with Africa would be based 
on a mixture of self-interest and shared experiences and development goals 
rather than ideology (Alden, 2007, pp.15-16). There was a recognition that China 
would need to find new, secure sources of energy to fuel its economic growth. 
For China, ensuring oil supplies is a national imperative. China’s internal stability 
and the security of the ruling Chinese Communist Party (CCP) depends on 
guaranteeing that a shortage of energy, particularly oil, does not constrain the 
economic growth needed to prevent social unrest (Yergin, 2012, p.194). The 
Middle East was, and is, viewed as an unreliable supplier due to political 
instability (especially post 2001), and so Africa has gained greater prominence 
(although as will be discussed, instability remains an issue). 
 
China’s growing presence in Africa threatens traditional Western dominance in 
Africa’s economies and reflects the disillusionment felt towards the West and its 
attempts to “help” the continent. This has engendered suspicion on the part of 
the United States and other Western countries as to China’s true motivations, as 
well as concerns that China’s policy of non-interference and no strings attached 
aid will undermine human rights and democracy in the target countries (Lum, 
2009, p.1). A 2005 Department of Defense report argued that China’s dependence 
on foreign supplies of oil is shaping China’s strategy and policy, factoring into 
China’s relations with a range of “pariah” states such as Angola, Sudan, Iran and 
Venezuela.  The blocking of the China National Offshore Oil Corporation’s 
(CNOOC) attempt in 2005 to purchase the Unocal Corporation, an American oil 
and gas producer, by Congress is an indication of the distrust felt towards China 
and its energy industry and the level of competition felt for control over energy 
assets (Klare, 2006, p.183). China’s foreign aid and investment practices 
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exacerbate this, with direct economic linkages to China’s economic development 
needs being commonplace. Nearly all economic assistance is aimed at facilitating 
the supply of raw materials such as oil, minerals, timber, and agricultural 
products (Lum, 2009, pp.1-2). Chinese investment is also more attractive than its 
Western counterparts because of the Chinese practice of linking investment to 
other projects to improve physical infrastructure such as ports and roads (Alden, 
2007, pp.12-13). The Chinese government also provides backing to these projects 
through the China Development Bank and the China Export Import Bank, as well 
as becoming directly involved through a strategy of strategy of locking-in access 
to resources in developing countries through government-to-government 
agreements (Alden, 2007, pp.11-12). Furthermore, China is also edging in on 
other areas of traditional U.S. dominance, such as Saudi Arabia. The Saudis have 
increasingly been turning to emerging markets such as China and India to find 
buyers for their oil. In 2005 King Abdullah made his first official visit to China, 
assigning energy and military cooperation agreements. Chinese President Hu 
Jintao made reciprocal visits in 2006 and 2013 (Ottoway, 2009). Having said that, 
in 2010 Angola overtook Saudi Arabia to become China’s largest crude oil 
supplier (Brown, 2013, p.62). It is this drive to acquire valuable and increasingly 
scarce natural resources in regions of the world that has been counted as a 
potential threat to the security interests of the U.S.  
 
America’s view is that reliance on foreign oil is made into a greater security 
threat because the rising influence of emerging powers and their national oil 
companies (NOCs) in Africa (and other locations) threatens the openness of 
global oil markets on which the U.S. depends. NOCs control approximately 85 
percent of global oil reserves, and if the NOCs of countries like China, with whom 
the U.S. has an uncertain relationship, come to control a significant portion of 
these reserves and this the global energy market, it will be increasingly difficult 
for the U.S to maintain energy security (Andreasson, 2014, p.4). From the 
American perspective, China’s involvement in African oil production is intended 
to “aid and abet African dictators, [and] gain a stranglehold on precious African 
natural resources” (Klare and Volman, 2006, p.305). From China’s perspective, 
attempts by the United States and other Western powers to discredit and blocks 
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its involvement in African energy is viewed as part of a larger strategy of 
containment (Xianping, 2013), which only serves to exacerbate tension and the 
sense of competition:   
“The US aid programmes and military initiatives described above are aimed 
principally at combating terrorism and containing local threats to the safe 
flow of oil. But the very act of building military ties with African 
governments  and  providing them  with  arms  and  military  assistance  has  
already evolved into a kind of low-level military competition with China for 
the loyalty of local elites. China, too, appears to be seeking ties of this sort, 
through its own modest military aid programmes.” (Klare and Volman, 
2006, p.306) 
China’s growing presence in Africa has generated suspicion in the United States, 
combined as it is with China’s growing influence in other areas of the world 
traditionally deemed the sphere of influence of the United States. This suspicion 
is exacerbated by China’s interest in acquiring natural resources, the same 
resources which the United States and the rest of the global economy are also in 
need of. The United State appears to feel a compulsion to counter China’s 
economic and security cooperation in Africa with intensified engagement of its 
own, including an increase in military cooperation. What makes Chinese political 
and economic links with Africa threatening is the fact that Beijing “has not been 
co-opted in the U.S. led international order”. China is fiercely independent in its 
foreign policy and its goals do not necessarily match up with those of the U.S, 
making it worrying that its wealth allows it to buy influence at the expense of U.S. 
interests (O’Reilly, 2014).   
 
Normative dimensions of securitization 
Many argue that securitizing an issue often only makes the situation worse and 
does not help in providing solutions. In the case of the U.S. and Africa, 
securitizing U.S. policy has the effect of crowding out development agencies like 
USAID, side-lines policies aimed at democratization, human rights and good 
governance, and has in many cases contributed to the preservation of 
authoritarian regimes. Government officials, academics, human rights groups and 
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journalists have all expressed concern that that many African governments 
which received counter-terrorism and other security assistance from the United 
States have poor human rights records. Extrajudicial killings, torture, corruption 
and the use of excessive force are common complaints against the militaries and 
security forces of countries such as Kenya, Ethiopia, Uganda, Sudan and Burundi. 
Combatting terrorism and maintaining stability are thought to be used as 
convenient justifications for governments to use security forces to quell dissent 
and stay in power (Ploch, 2010a, p.37). Given the much higher proportion of the 
government budget that is spent on defense rather than development/diplomatic 
operations4 there is concern about how the Pentagon may have influenced the 
direction of U.S. Africa policy away from civilian agencies and towards military 
and security actors (Keenan, 2010, p.36).  
 
The fear essentially is that U.S. engagement with Africa will be dominated by 
programmes and policies that relate to a set of narrow security concerns rather 
than being focused on helping to achieve broad, long-term development and 
humanitarian goals (Copson, 2007, p.110). For instance, two United Nations 
resolutions which were essential to the goal of long-term peace in Africa, the 
Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples and the Arms Trade Treaty, were 
resisted by the United States. The U.S. successfully lobbied several African 
governments to block the Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples, which 
had the potential to obstruct American claims on Africa’s resources, and was the 
sole vote against the Arms treaty, which could have removed the justification for 
a U.S. military presence in Africa by making it harder or impossible for local 
armed resistance groups to arise (Keenan, 2008, p.19).  
 
One could argue that securitization is not necessarily a bad thing, as it can give an 
issue an increased level of urgency and draw the attention of high-level 
                                                             
4 For the 2013 Fiscal Year (FY), for instance, the combined Department of State/USAID budget 
was US$51.6 billion, compared to US$613.9 billion for the Department of Defense. U.S 
Department of Defense, 2012. DOD Releases Fiscal 2013 Budget Proposal [Online]. Office of the 
Assistant Secretary of Defense (Public Affairs), U.S. Department of Defense. Available: 
http://www.defense.gov/releases/release.aspx?releaseid=15056 [Accessed 17 December 2013]; 
U.S. Department of State, 2012. State and USAID - FY 2013 Budget [Online]. Washington, DC: Office 
of Website Management, Bureau of Public Affairs, U.S. Department of State. Available: 
http://www.state.gov/r/pa/prs/ps/2012/02/183808.htm [Accessed 17 December 2013]. 
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government officials towards formulating a response. With regards to Africa, 
securitization could help reverse the “marginalization” of the continent’s plight 
and help to justify increased development assistance to a citizenry at home 
already facing government cutbacks and economic recession (Abrahamsen, 2004, 
p.682). For instance, U.S. aid to African countries declined sharply in the 1990s 
after the end of the Cold War and the end of competition with the Soviet Union 
for influence on the continent (Copson, 2007, pp.6-7). However, although 
securitization may be able to attract funding and attention, discourses of security 
are more often than not underpinned by an “us vs. them” dichotomy and a “logic 
of threat” which twists the goal of engagement away from development goals 
towards the goal of achieving greater security “for us” regardless of the effect on 
“them” (Abrahamsen, 2004, p.682). This can lead to overlooking of human rights 
and corruption issues in countries which are deemed to be important to the U.S 
(Copson, 2007, p.7). In Nigeria, for instance, the police have been accused by the 
United Nations Special Rapporteur on Torture of using torture as a central tool in 
law enforcement operations (Ploch, 2010b, p.26). Furthermore, the “us” in 
question nearly always refers to the state, conferring upon the state the primary 
role in addressing the security threat in question, which is not necessarily 
beneficial to the situation (Wæver, 1998).  
 
Security has become intertwined with development even at the level of global 
development policy, although this trend stems from a more altruistic place than 
concerns about oil. Symptoms of underdevelopment, such as poverty, are held to 
be the root causes of “new wars”, international crime, and terrorism. This has 
resulted in a radicalisation of development policy and a shifting of responsibility 
for engaging with these issues from civilian to military actors in order to deal 
with this new security framework (Duffield, 2001, pp.15-16). This first signs of 
this vis-à-vis U.S. policy in Africa was the 1999 National Security Strategy 
released by the Clinton administration, which emphasised the importance of 
conflict resolution in Africa. After the emergence of violent extremist groups in 
Somalia, Nigeria, the Sahel and Mali, increasing incidents of piracy, smuggling, 
and bombings, and the ongoing effects of the Arab Spring, Africa has increasingly 
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come to feature in U.S. security policy as key part of the global strategic 
environment (Varhola and Sheperd, 2013, p.325).  
 
To summarise this opening section, the aim of this thesis is to examine whether 
or not there has been a new securitization of U.S. policy in Africa. Literature and 
media are both telling us that there has been an increasingly security-focussed 
tone to U.S. engagement in Africa, shifting away from the more developmental 
and economic focus of the 1980s and 1990s. For many, for many this is a negative 
development as it exacerbates human rights abuses, poverty, and authoritarian 
governance. Having provided some empirical evidence to suggest that this 
securitization is in fact occurring in Africa, I will now test this claim in greater 
detail by examining the case of U.S. engagement with Nigeria.  
 
 
Section 2: Nigeria and the U.S. 
 
Having outlined the theoretical basis of the claim that U.S. policy in Africa is 
becoming more securitized, this section will provide a history of U.S. relations 
with Nigeria from the time of Nigeria’s independence in 1960 until 2001. It will 
then consider how the relationship changed after 2001, before examining in 
greater detail how the three securitizing factors presented in the previous 
section precipitated this change. 
 
History of the U.S.-Nigeria Relationship: evidence of change and securitization 
The Cold War: 1960-1991  
In the early years of Nigeria’s independence5, it featured very little in U.S. foreign 
policy, even though it was (and remains) the most populous country in Africa. 
The only reason it was a factor in U.S. considerations at all was in the context of 
competition with the Soviet Union for influence with unaligned states. When 
Jimmy Carter became president in 1977, however, things changed and Nigeria 
                                                             
5 Nigeria gained independence from Great Britain in 1960. 
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(and the rest of Africa) began to feature more heavily in U.S. foreign policy 
considerations in its own right. Carter had campaigned vigorously against the 
previous President Ford’s Africa policy, and with the help of his Secretary of 
State, Cyrus Vance, moved towards a new approach that downplayed the threat 
of communism and East-West competition as a framing factor in shaping U.S.-
Africa relations (Ogunbadejo, 1979, pp.117-18). The new importance accorded to 
Nigeria, was indicated by the visit in October 1977 of Nigerian head of state 
General Olusegun Obasanjo and the reciprocal visit of President Carter to Nigeria 
the year after, the first visit by an American president to a black African country 
(Ogunbadejo, 1979, pp.120-21).  
 
Why did Nigeria suddenly assume greater importance in American foreign 
policy? The 1970s saw the birth of fears about energy security after the Arab oil 
embargo and subsequent oil shocks in 1973, and in 1980 the Carter Doctrine 
explicitly demonstrated the importance of oil to U.S. national security. In 1977 
around half of Nigeria’s oil went to the United States, making Nigeria the U.S.’s 
second largest supplier after Saudi Arabia and a vital buffer against instability in 
the Middle East (Ogunbadejo, 1979, p.122). Nigeria’s oil was what strengthened 
its position in world affairs, not its enormous population, large army, and 
leadership efforts on the African continent (Ogunbadejo, 1979, pp.125-26). The 
relationship did not extend beyond much more than commercial contact, 
however, until after 2001. Even when the Cold War ended in 1991, Africa as a 
whole received relatively little attention from the United States, viewed for the 
most part as an addendum to relations with Europe (Keenan, 2008, p.16) and not 
part of the U.S.’s security world view.  
 
Post-Cold War: the 1990s 
During the 1990s U.S. relations with Nigeria plateaued. On the one hand, Nigeria 
was still a major and reliable oil supplier, guaranteeing its importance to the U.S. 
On the other, major concerns were raised about the human rights abuses the 
military regime was accused of carrying out. The U.S. was forced to try and strike 
a balance between maintaining access to much needed oil suppliers, and 
upholding its reputation as a defender of human rights and democracy.  
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In 1993, the Nigerian National Defense and Security Council annulled the results 
of the presidential election, which had given victory to Moshood Abiola, instead 
handing power to an interim government chosen by the retiring president 
General Ibrahim Babangida. Despite promises that the country would be 
returned to civilian rule, General Sani Abacha took power and dissolved all 
existing organs of state, effectively setting up his own military regime (BBC, 
1999). This subversion of the electoral process resulted in widespread civil 
unrest, including strikes from the country’s oil workers. There were widespread 
arrests and harassment of human rights leaders, opposition groups and 
politicians including former president Olusegun Obasanjo, who was much 
admired in the West (Hoffman, 1995, p.151). Many foreign observers predicted 
that there would be a civil war (Hoffman, 1995, p.148) although this fear proved 
to be unfounded. The U.S. President at the time, Bill Clinton, was forced to choose 
between defending human rights and recognizing the importance of Nigeria as a 
partner for the U.S. The execution in 1995 of Ken Saro-Wiwa, the leader of the 
nonviolent Movement for the Survival of the Ogoni People (MOSOP) put 
increased pressure on the United States to cut ties with the military dictatorship 
of General Abacha, particularly after Saro-Wiwa was depicted as a martyr by 
Greenpeace thanks to his opposition to pollution caused by Shell Nigeria (Corry, 
1999, p.25). However, Nigeria was a consistently reliable oil supplier that had not 
participated in the 1973 Arab oil embargo, despite being a member of OPEC, and 
the potential for growth of U.S. investment in Nigeria’s energy sector made the 
Clinton administration reluctant to completely cut ties with the Abucha regime 
(Hoffman, 1995, p.149). Nigeria’s size and regional dominance also complicated 
matters. It had a vast population and an economy second only to South Africa’s. 
Nigeria was a major contributor to United Nations (UN) peacekeeping operations 
and assumed a leading role in negotiating an end to the Liberian civil war. Its oil 
wealth and extensive political involvement in African affairs make it resistant to 
pressure from foreign governments, making it hard for the U.S. to bring about 
internal change even if it had wanted to.  In the end, Clinton did suspend military 
assistance, including joint exercises and training, as well as institute a review of 
all defense related exports, suspend all non-security related foreign aid except 
for humanitarian and democracy assistance, and deny visas to members of the 
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Nigerian government (Hoffman, 1995, p.155). Oil imports were not halted 
though, and these measures did not have much effect on Nigeria’s policy towards 
jailed political opponents (such as Moshood Abiola and Obasanjo) and did not 
precipitate a return to civilian rule.  
 
The halt on U.S. security involvement did not last long, however, and by 1999 
military cooperation had resumed, paving the way for the intensified security 
relationship that would follow the September 11 terrorist attacks. This early 
cooperation was aimed at modernizing and professionalizing the military and 
cementing civilian oversight of the Nigerian armed forces. The action plan for U.S. 
military assistance had three components to it. The first was to create an 
institution similar to the U.S. Office of the Secretary of Defense in order to 
increase civilian oversight of the military as well as working with the Nigerian 
military to identity concepts of the role and missions of the military and the force 
structure that would be required. The second component involved enhancing the 
capacity of the Nigerian military to project force, mainly through providing 
updated tech manuals and specialist maintenance training for Nigeria’s fleet of 
C0130 cargo aircraft. These were vital for Nigeria to participate in regional 
peacekeeping. The final component of the plan involved providing training aids 
and equipment for the Nigerian military. It was acknowledged that Nigeria’s 
armed forces had proven both willing and able to participate in peacekeeping 
missions, and Operation Focus Relief aimed to train the militaries of Nigeria, 
Ghana and Senegal in peacekeeping operations. In Nigeria it had a dual purpose 
of repairing relationships with Nigeria’s military after the transition to civilian 
rule in 1999. It included a $66 million military aid package, including $20 million 
that was set aside for training as well as equipment such as “communication 
systems, rifles, mortars, machine guns, ammunition, and light-wheeled non-
combat vehicles” (GlobalSecurity).  
 
This brief history of U.S.-Nigeria relations prior to 2001 shows that U.S. policy 
towards Nigeria has never been entirely altruistic: it has always varied as to how 
much of an influence trade, energy and geopolitical rivalry exerted on the 
determination of policy. During the 1960s and 1970s, the drive to secure oil 
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supplies through diplomatic support and trade agreements dominated the 
relationship. In the 1980s the dictates of the Cold War determined Nigeria’s 
importance, emphasising its role as a battleground for influence with the Soviet 
Union. Moving into the 1990s, human rights concerns and a distrust of foreign 
entanglements following the disastrous U.S. intervention in Somalia led to a 
cooling of the relationship, although by 1999 relations had by and large returned 
to their pre-coup levels. The next few sections will show to what extent U.S. 
policy towards Nigeria became even more intensely securitized in the 21st 
century.  
After 9/11: A new securitization? 
After the September 11 terrorist attacks, Nigeria’s importance to the United 
States became more complex. Nigeria’s capacity as an oil producer became even 
more important due to the unrest and instability in the Middle East which 
followed the invasion of Afghanistan in 2001. From this point the United States 
had two main priorities in Nigeria: to secure the oil resources of the Niger Delta, 
and to pre-empt the development of another front in the war on terror (Morris 
and Edel, 2006, p.297).  Countering the rise of China in Africa would soon emerge 
as a priority as well. 
 
The most obvious change that took place after 2001 was the launching of the 
Global War on Terror (GWOT). This increased Nigeria’s importance in the 
context of U.S. national security, both because of the threat home-grown terrorist 
groups posed to Nigeria’s capacity to produce and export oil, and also because of 
the possibility of terrorist groups finding safe-haven in Nigeria and the Sahel. 
During a 2002 visit to Nigeria, the U.S. Assistant Secretary of State for Africa, 
Walter Kansteiner, was quoted as saying that “‘African oil is of strategic national 
interest […] and it will increase and become more important as we go forward” 
(Crawley, 2002). From 2002 U.S. oil imports from Africa (particularly Nigeria, 
Angola, and Algeria) increased greatly as reducing dependence on Middle East oil 
supplies became a strategic priority. However, violence in Nigeria and the spread 
of terrorism across the Sahel and into northern Nigeria and Chad was also a 
rising concern and damped some of the hope for Africa’s emergence as a 
replacement supplier (Taylor, 2014, p.11).  
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In the years after 9/11, the intensity of security cooperation between the United 
States and Nigeria increased exponentially. A number of military assistance and 
training programmes were set up, far more than in the previous forty years of 
relations between the two countries. At the beginning this increased assistance 
was mainly to ensure that the U.S. would retain access to the oil resources of the 
Niger Delta, which were particularly important as Middle Eastern oil supply was 
insecure after the 2003 invasion of Iraq (one of the world’s major oil producers). 
In 2006 the Congressional Budget Justification for Foreign Operations noted that 
Nigeria held huge importance “as a leading supplier of petroleum to the U.S.” and 
that a “disruption of supply from Nigeria would represent a major blow to the oil 
security strategy of the U.S” (Onuorah, 2013). The arms sales, technical 
assistance and training programmes were aimed at enhancing the capacities of 
recipient states, like Nigeria, so that they could better contain the internal 
instability and conflict that threatened on- and off-shore oil production. The main 
channels for the provision of arms and military equipment are the Foreign 
Military Sales (FMS) and Foreign Military Sales Financing (FMF) programmes, as 
well the direct sales from U.S defense contractors through the Commercial Sales 
programme (Klare and Volman, 2006, p.299) and the funding provided by 
Section 1206 of the NDAA. Under Section 1206, Nigeria received over US$18 
million in training and equipment, both on its own and in conjunction with 
neighbouring states in the FY2006-2010. The money covered things such as 
counterterrorism capacity building for the military, providing light infantry 
Vehicles and communications equipment, civil-military relations training, 
information-sharing network establishment, and Gulf of Guinea Regional 
Maritime Awareness Capability Aid (Serafino, 2013, p.27).  
 
The watershed moment in this intensified military contact was the creation of 
AFRICOM in 2007. This was a key marker in the changed relationship between 
both the United States and Nigeria, and with Africa as a whole. The Nigerian 
President Umaru Musa Yar’Adua was highly supportive of the decision to create a 
dedicated Africa Command, despite opposition from civil society and other Africa 
countries, arguing that it would help African governments maintain peace and 
security (Ploch, 2008, p.25). Under AFRICOM command U.S. Army Africa has, for 
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example, conducted military-to-military intelligence sharing and training, such as 
in the use of biometric collection systems that will help the Nigerian armed 
forces and law enforcement protect their borders and other areas where 
extremist groups are active (U.S. Army Africa, 2013).  AFRICOM has also 
sponsored training exercises such as Exercise Flintlock, which is one of the main 
examples of military cooperation between the U.S. and Nigeria. Flintlock is an 
annual exercise held among U.S., African and European counterterrorism forces 
and has taken place since 2006. It includes both ground and air forces operating 
across the Sahel region. The aim is the improve the capacity of African states to 
provide stability to North and West Africa and to reduce safe havens and support 
for violent extremist groups. Flintlock 11 in 2011 built on previous exercises, 
developing cooperative relationships among the armed forces of the TSCTP 
states “by strengthening security institutions, promoting multilateral sharing of 
information, and facilitating informal network building”. Flintlock is run by 
Special Operations Command Africa’s (SOCAFRICA) Joint Special Operations Task 
Force-Trans Sahara and aims to improve “military interoperability and capacity-
building” in U.S., Canadian and European partner nations in north and west 
Africa. In 2011 around 800 military personnel were involved from the U.S., 
Canada, France, Spain, the Netherlands, Germany Burkina Faso, Chad, Mali, 
Mauritania, Nigeria and Senegal (U.S. Army Africa, 2008). Other exercises include 
Exercise Africa Endeavour, which was held in Nigeria in 2008 (U.S. Army Africa, 
2012b), Exercise Maritime Safari in 2008 (Poplin, 2008) and Exercise Obangame 
Express (U.S. Army Africa, 2012a). Most recently, the AFRICAN WINDS training 
programme took place in October 2013, and involved training in combatting oil 
theft and piracy. It involved teams from the U.S., U.K. and the Netherlands as well 
as the Nigerian Army, Navy and Air Force, who trained alongside troops from 
Morocco, Senegal, Ghana, Togo, Benin, and Cameroon (ThisDayLive, 2013).  
 
On a smaller but no less important scale, according to Captain Robert Smith of 
the Naval Special Warfare Group 2, the Navy elite quick-response team NSWU 10 
(commissioned by SOCAFRICA in 2011) has been involved in strategically 
important countries such as Nigeria, Somalia and Uganda. The unit’s former 
commander, Captain J. Dane Thorleifson, stated that its tasks included “building 
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critical host nation security capacity; enabling, advising, and assisting our African 
CT [counterterror] partner forces so they can swiftly counter and destroy al-
Shabaab, AQIM [Al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb], and Boko Haram” (Turse, 
2013). Furthermore, in January 2014, the Nigerian army announced the 
establishment of an Army Special Operations Command (NASOC) after a bilateral 
Counter-Terrorism and Counter-Insurgency Lessons Learned Exchange held 
between Nigeria and the U.S. Early indications suggest that NASOC will have 
forces positioned in the north to combat Boko Haram, in the south to deal with 
security problems in the Niger Delta, an expeditionary force for external use, and 
a central command to deal with hostage rescue. It has been confirmed that 
AFRICOM, SOCAFRICA and Office of Security Cooperation in the U.S. Embassy in 
Abuja would be providing training and equipment to help get the newly created 
NASOC operational (Warner, 2014).  
 
The U.S. Navy has also increased its presence in the Gulf of Guinea since 2003, 
conducting joint exercises with Nigeria and hosting conferences on maritime 
security in the region (Klare and Volman, 2006, p.301). Nigeria has been a 
participant in most of the training exercises run by the U.S., such as a training 
programme involving over 200 sailors and U.S. Coast Guard members partnering 
with eleven Gulf of Guinea states (Nigeria, as well as Angola, Benin, Sao Tome and 
Principe, the DRC, Equatorial Guinea, Gabon, Ghana, Togo and Cameroon) to 
improve their navies and maritime security forces ability to combat piracy, 
terrorism, smuggling and illegal immigration (Gilmore, 2007).  In 2008 the Africa 
Endeavour military exercise was held in Nigeria. The exercise was focused on 
communications interoperability and was co-sponsored by EUCOM and the 
Nigerian Ministry of Defense. 21 African nations were involved, as well as the 
African Union (AU), the U.S., Sweden and ECOWAS, all working on command, 
control, communications and information systems integration and 
interoperability, which helps militaries to work together (Miller, 2008). Also in 
2008, a bilateral exercise between the Nigerian Air force and Navy and the U.S. 
Navy was held in Lagos, focused on search and rescue, aircraft maintenance and 
maritime safety (AFRICOM, 2008).  
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Some specific examples of the kinds of programmes that the U.S. has initiated 
with Nigeria since 2001 include:  
 Trans-Sahara Counterterrorism Partnership (TSCTP): The TSCTP 
kicked off in June 2005 with Exercise Flintlock, replacing the Pan-Sahel 
Initiative (PSI), which ended in 2004. The TSCTP aims to improve on the 
PSI both in terms of funding and the number of countries that are involved 
(Miles, 2005). The TSCTP expanded the scope of the PSI to include Nigeria, 
Senegal, Morocco, Algeria and Tunisia. The aim of these two programs was 
to train African militaries in military tactics, border security, drug 
trafficking and counter-terrorism throughout the Sahel region. It is 
specifically designed to prevent the expansion of terrorist activity and 
extremist groups in West and North Africa. The main goals of the TSCTP 
are to enhance trans-Saharan cooperation on counterterrorism, to 
continue the “specialized Counterterrorism Assistance Training and 
Terrorist Interdiction Program (TIP)”, public outreach programmes, 
community development, democracy strengthening programmes, and 
military-to-military cooperation. The TSCTP is led by the State 
Department, but works in concert with USAID, the Department of Defense, 
AFRICOM, the FBI and the Department of the Treasury. A large portion of 
TSCTP activities are carried out by the Department of Defense, which 
works with AFRICOM and SOCAFRICA on Operation Enduring Freedom – 
Trans-Sahara (OEF-TS), working with partner countries to prevent 
terrorism and enhance regional stability. OEF-TS is the military 
component of the TSCTP and aims to increase stability and security in 
West and North Africa. It includes “train and equip missions […] partner 
nation staff information training and mentorship programs, numerous 
Joint Planning and Assistance Team (JPAT), and Military Information 
Support Team (MIST) missions, as well as Joint Combined Exchange 
Training (JCET) events and is currently building information sharing that 
can be used by all of the OEF-TS countries” (AFRICOM, 2010b). By 
“improving border security, promoting democratic governance, and 
reinforcing regional as well as bilateral military ties” and assisting in 
public diplomacy efforts to counter extremist ideology, OEF-TS is aimed at 
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combatting violent extremist organisations in North and West Africa 
(AFRICOM, 2010a, p.25).  
 African Partnership Station Programme: The African Partnership 
Station Programme is a U.S.-led initiative in which American ships are 
maintaining a “persistent presence” in the Gulf of Guinea in an effort to 
prevent oil theft as well as illegal fishing people and drug smuggling, and 
piracy. Training of local military officers is also an important aspect of the 
programme. Although the United States says that oil is not the primary 
motivation behind the programme, it does not deny that it is a factor 
(Peel, 2010, p.138). Nigeria is viewed as a safeguard against unrest in the 
Arabian Gulf, but production is often shut down in the Delta for security 
reasons. This means that often other countries, such as Angola, come out 
as the top producers in Africa even though Nigeria’s reserves are four 
times greater (Peel, 2010, pp.138-39). Theft of oil from Nigerian offshore 
platforms in the Gulf is also a significant problem, as is the use of the Gulf 
by thieves to transport oil stolen from the Delta (Peel, 2010, p.142). 
Sabotage is also an issue. In 2008, for example, MEND launched an attack 
on the Bonga oil field, owned by Shell, closing it down for three weeks and 
causing national production to drop by 10 percent. Part of the training 
provided by the United States under African Partnership Station has been 
based around defending offshore platforms from attack, even though 
officially the U.S. is not involved in protecting oil installations (Peel, 2010, 
pp.142-43).   
 African Contingency Operations Training and Assistance program 
(ACOTA): In 2004 the African Crisis Response Initiative (which had been 
set up in 1996) was renamed the ACOTA programme. ACOTA provides 
training and equipment to improve African militaries capacity to 
undertake multinational peacekeeping operations. ACOTA is linked to the 
Joint Combined Arms Training System (JCATS) training centres, which are 
an inexpensive method of providing officer training. Nigeria is the only 
country besides Canada which has JCATS software, and has had the 
system since 2003 (Abramovici and Stoker, 2004, p.688-89). 
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 State Partnership Program (SPP): The SPP links U.S. National Guards 
with partner countries with the aim of supporting EUCOM (now 
AFRICOM)’s security objectives and assisting partner countries in making 
the transition from authoritarianism or military rule to democracy (Jones, 
2005, p.20). Nigeria was partnered with the California National Guard in 
2006. 
 
 
As well as increasing training exercises and enhancing intelligence cooperation, 
the United States is also fortifying military infrastructure and seeking access 
agreements for a series of “lily pad” bases (officially known as emergency 
operating bases) access North and West Africa (Emerson, 2006, p.258). The U.S. 
has agreements allowing it to use international airports as refuelling centres in 
29 countries, including Nnamdi Azikiwe International Airport in Abuja, Nigeria as 
well as maintaining fuel bunkers in Lagos and 9 other locations. Furthermore, 
between 2011 and 2013, the Army Corps of Engineers reportedly spent $48 
million on construction projects in 33 countries, including Nigeria (Turse, 2013). 
In 2011 the U.S. Navy funded the instalment and training in the use of two 
Regional Maritime Awareness Capability (RMAC) radar sites, one in Lagos and 
one on Bonny Island (Arvind, 2011).  
 
In summary, prior to 2001 Nigeria-U.S. relations fluctuated from cordial to 
strained depending on the government in power. At times of military rule, human 
rights abuses made it difficult for the U.S. to engage closely with Nigeria. 
However, throughout all this time economic connections, particularly the oil 
trade, were emphasised and protected. After 2001 and the launching of the 
Global War on Terror, U.S. relations with Nigeria moved beyond the economic 
sphere to encompass military and security cooperation as well. This was 
particularly true after the invasion of Iraq in 2003, perhaps due to fears over 
instability of global oil supply. 2003 was also the time that Boko Haram emerged 
in Nigeria’s north and threatened the stability of the country and oil supplies by 
diverting security forces from the Niger Delta, where unrest also blossomed. A 
second surge in engagement with Nigeria occurred in 2007, the year in which 
AFRICOM was formed, oil imports from Nigeria peaked, and the number of U.S. 
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troops in Iraq increased by over 20,000 due to increasing guerrilla attacks and 
instability (Beaumont et al., 2007). Post-2001 also saw the phenomenal growth 
of China’s economy and its rapidly expanding overseas investments and 
influence in resource-rich countries.  
 
Securitizing factors 
Nigeria and oil  
“Nigeria is the United States’ fifth largest  source  of  imported  oil  […] Gulf of 
Guinea crude is prized on the world market for  its  low-sulphur  content, and 
Nigeria’s proximity to the United States relative to that of oil producing countries in 
the Middle East makes Nigeria’s oil particularly attractive to American interests.” 
(Ploch, 2008, p.21) 
The first factor in the securitization of oil in Africa in countries such as Nigeria 
stems from the status of oil as a vital strategic commodity in terms of both 
military and economic power, as discussed in section one. The actual and feared 
disruption of world oil supplies caused by the chronic instability in the Middle 
East following World War Two (such as the Arab oil embargo) prompted policy 
makers to start looking in less conventional places to put in place a safeguard 
against further upheaval. Events in the Middle East in the 1990s (especially the 
Gulf War) brought about fears of a return of oil price spikes. This fear was 
compounded after the September 11 terrorist attacks in the United States and 
the subsequent invasions of Afghanistan in 2001 and Iraq in 2003 (Yetiv, 2004, 
pp.2-3). One of the locations which came to the forefront was Africa, where 
significant reserves of not only oil but gas and valuable minerals were finally able 
to be exploited after the chaos of decolonisation in the 1960s (Shelley, 2005, p.1). 
Particular interest was paid to states such as Nigeria, Angola, Algeria, Libya, 
Gabon, Cameroon, Sudan (now Sudan and South Sudan) and Chad6. Recognition 
of these countries’ importance as an alternative supply of oil in the face of 
continuing instability in the Middle East has led to an increasing amount of 
                                                             
6 Key African oil producers (producing more than 0.2 million bpd) are: Angola, Nigeria, 
Sudan/South Sudan, Algeria, Equatorial Guinea, Gabon, and the DR Congo. Eia. Countries [Online]. 
http://www.eia.gov/: U.S. Energry Information Adminstration. Available: 
http://www.eia.gov/countries/index.cfm?view=production#tabs-3 [Accessed 12 July 2013]. 
  Lucy Power 300197890 
 
Page 44 of 83 
 
attention from not only the United States but also rising powers such as China 
(Volman, 2009, p.7). 
 
Between 2004 and 2008, rising world oil prices (Reuters, 2013) increased the 
importance of Nigeria and other West African oil producers to Washington and 
other importers energy security policies, who were eager for a buffer against 
instability in the Arabian Gulf (Peel, 2010, xvii). As of January 2013 Nigeria had 
the second largest proven crude oil reserves in Africa, second only to Libya. 
These reserves are mostly concentrated in the Niger River Delta region and 
offshore in the Bight of Benin, and Bight of Bonny and the Gulf of Guinea. 
Currently exploration projects are focusing on deep and ultra-deep offshore oil 
fields, in part due to the security risks associated with on-shore and shallow 
water fields (EIA, 2013b). During times of full production, Nigeria is the largest 
oil producer in Africa and is one of the top ten exporters in the world, exporting 
around 2-2.6 million barrels per day (compared with mega producers like Saudi 
Arabia, which produces up to 8.53 million barrels per day). Nigeria is in the same 
category as other medium producers who are also subjects of great geopolitical 
interest, such as Venezuela, Kuwait, and Iran (Peel, 2010, p.6). Historically, half of 
Nigeria’s oil has gone to the United States where is has made up approximately 
10% of U.S. imports. Nigeria’s oil is important to the United States for three 
reasons. Firstly, the quality of Nigerian oil is very high and is easily refined into 
gasoline. Second, it is physically closer to the United States than the Middle East, 
reducing shipping costs and the risks of piracy. Third, the Nigerian government 
is, for the most part, friendly to the United States and is at least nominally a 
democracy (Peel, 2010, p.6).  
 
This new “scramble for Africa” has manifested in a reliance on expanding military 
ties and military assistance in order to ensure the security of the continent’s oil 
supplies (Volman, 2009, p.22). This securitization has removed African oil from 
the normal realm of political and economic relations, and extraordinary 
measures such as the deployment of military forces have been justified to deal 
with it. Considerations of oil supply have moved from the category of the 
market/supply/demand to a category of risk and threat. Ensuring oil flows from 
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Africa has been deemed a security problem rather than an economic or political 
one. This has resulted in the United States treating oil supply as a zero-sum game 
in which it is in competition with other states, particularly China. As discussed 
earlier, a similar trajectory has been observed in the Persian Gulf (Klare and 
Volman, 2006, p.302), where the “unimpeded flow of oil” has been declared a 
national security interest and followed by arms for oil agreements, weapons 
sales, military aid and training, military bases, and even the deployment of 
military forces (Klare and Volman, 2006, p.298).  
 
However, Nigeria’s capacity to reach its full production capacity is hampered by 
corruption, poor infrastructure, and instability caused by terrorism and 
insurgency. Piracy, sabotage and oil theft, for instance, are significant problems 
for the oil industry in Nigeria. Both on- and off-shore production and distribution 
networks that are owned and operated by companies such as Exxon, Chevron, 
Shell, Total and Eni are highly vulnerable to sabotage and theft (Peel, 2010, p.6). 
In 2003, for example, a report commissioned by Shell estimated that as many as 
685,000 barrels of oil (a third of total production) was being stolen each day 
(Peel, 2010, p.15). This poor security environment has resulted in a trend of 
international oil companies selling off their stakes in onshore and shallow water 
projects in the region. Between 2010 and 2013, for example, Shell sold its shares 
it eight onshore licenses and is considering selling its stakes in major pipelines 
running through the Delta (EIA, 2013b). Many international oil companies, like 
Shell, have been forced to declare force majeure7 due to attacks on infrastructure 
and oil theft. For example, leaks caused by oil thieves damaging pipes prompted 
Shell to declare force majeure on exports of Bonny Light crude oil in October 
2013 (Kent, 2013). Unrest in the oil-producing region of the Niger River Delta 
dates back to the 1990s, when protests staged by MOSOP against Shell’s activities 
in the area prompted a harsh military crackdown and led to the summary 
executions of the group’s leaders, including the aforementioned Ken Saro-Wiwa 
(Peel, 2010, p.7). Periodic outbreaks of violence by new protest groups have been 
commonplace since then, such as the attacks carried out by MEND, which have 
repeatedly cut Nigeria’s oil production by as much as a quarter and had a knock-
                                                             
7 A legal clause freeing both parties from a contractual agreement due to events outside their 
control that prevent them from meeting their obligations. 
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on effect of increasingly world oil prices (Ploch, 2012, p.17). Agitation for 
independence or autonomy for the Delta is viewed with trepidation by foreign oil 
companies and their governments, which sees the Delta’s oil as a safeguard 
against the volatile Middle East (Peel, 2010, p.9). The security crisis caused in the 
north of the country by terrorist groups like Boko Haram and Ansaru are 
compounded by the problem, as they threaten the very fabric of the Nigerian 
state, stretching the government to the breaking point and threatening the 
country’s capacity to keep functioning and sending oil to the outside world. There 
is a very real fear that Nigeria will turn into another Sudan, torn apart by civil 
war with its oil production crippled and presenting a perfect breeding ground for 
terrorism.  
 
Supply problems in places like Nigeria and Sudan matter not because the United 
States is dependent on supplies from those particular countries, but because they 
make oil more expensive than it should be by taking supply out of the global pool. 
These disruptions across Africa and the Middle East have essentially removed the 
production gains made by the United States recently in shale oil (Johnson, 2013). 
This has the effect of reducing spare production capacity in places like Saudi 
Arabia, which have to pump more to make up the global shortfall, stymieing 
economic growth in countries around the world, and generally making the oil 
market unstable and subject to sudden price spikes (Johnson, 2013). Due to the 
interconnectedness of the global economy this has a knock-on effect on the U.S. 
economy, which as I discussed earlier is central to the survival of the state as an 
autonomous entity. Therefore, even though the United States may be importing 
less oil from Nigeria (down to 4% in the first half of 2013), other countries still 
reply on such producers. European imports of Nigerian oil, for instance, 
increased over 40 percent between 2011 and 2012 (EIA, 2013b). Ensuring that 
Nigeria’s oil keeps on flowing has therefore become a security problem for the 
United States, and fostering friendly relations with the Nigerian government and 
helping it to combat the instability within its borders is therefore a high priority 
for the U.S. As I have shown, one way it has done this is by offering assistance in 
the fight against Boko Haram, Ansaru, MEND and other violent insurgents in the 
form of military equipment and training, often under the rubric of the Global War 
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on Terror, the next factor which will be discussed in the securitization of U.S.-
Nigeria relations.  
Terrorism 
The terrorist threat in Nigeria is twofold: on the one hand there are terrorist 
groups which will be familiar to most people who read the news, Islamic groups 
like Boko Haram and Ansaru. On the other, there are groups which are specific to 
Nigeria and its particular domestic situation, like the anti-oil MEND and NDVPF. 
Terrorism of both kinds is an increasingly severe problem in Nigeria. Although 
there have been attacks since the 1990s, in the years after 9/11, and especially 
after 2007, the problem worsened. Nigeria rose from 16th out of 158 countries on 
the Global Terrorism Index (GTI) in 2008 to 6th in 2011, with around 168 
terrorist attacks in 2011 alone. Boko Haram was the main cause of this surge, but 
other groups were also involved such as MEND. With over 160 million people, a 
huge youth population, and the 6th largest Muslim population in the world 
Nigeria is of high strategic importance to the global Jihad movement (Sodipo, 
2013, p.2). This importance has been recognised by the United States: the 
President of Nigeria was the only African leader invited to discuss the crisis and 
officially received by President Bush following the September 11 attacks, despite 
the strong support offered by other African heads of state (Dagne, 2002, p.3). The 
problem is compounded by the lack of trust in the Nigerian security forces, who 
have been accused of human rights abuses and indiscriminate killing in the 
course of combatting these groups (Sodipo, 2013, p.1). The violence is also driven 
by opposition to the operations of international oil companies in the Niger Delta. 
Examples of the kinds of attacks, kidnappings, theft, and murders that have 
plagued Nigeria since 2003 include an attack on a naval base in 2003, the murder 
of five people (including two Americans working for ChevronTexaco) and the 
kidnapping of 16 oil workers in Bayelsa state in 2004, and a shootout in 2006 in 
the Niger Delta which killed 14 soldiers and cut Shell’s oil output by 115 BPD 
(Undp, 2006, p.113). 
   
The question is, why does the United States care about Nigerian terrorism? In the 
grand scheme of things, extremist Islamic groups such as Boko Haram and 
Ansaru are not global terrorist threats on the scale of Al Qaeda, even though Boko 
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Haram’s tactics and rhetoric indicates that its attention and reach has spread far 
beyond its original base in north-eastern Nigeria. For example, Boko Haram 
fighters were reported to be fighting alongside AQIM, the Movement for Unity 
and Jihad in West Africa (MUJWA) and Ansar al-Din in northern Mali in 2012, 
returning to Nigeria after the French intervention with improved weapons and 
tactics learned on the battlefield (Raghavan, 2013). Nigerian nationals have been 
arrested fighting alongside the Taliban in Afghanistan, and Al Qaeda in the 
Arabian Peninsula (AQAP) claims to have sponsored the attempted terrorist 
attack on an American airliner on the 25th December 2009 (Ploch, 2010b, pp.20-
21). Together with clashes between Nigeria security forces and Islamist sects in 
the north and the spreading of Sunni Islam movements, fears have arisen that 
Nigerian citizens may be radicalised into carrying out farther attacks against 
targets in Nigeria or abroad (Ploch, 2010b, pp.20-21). It may be transforming 
into a transnational threat, although whether this inclination was more felt by 
those who split into the Ansaru group has yet to be seen (Ladislaw, 2013, p.1). 
The sophistication of the attacks and the indications of tacit support for the 
group among Northern elites (such as the failure of the government to act 
decisively despite an abundance of reports and recommendations on the group) 
are cause for concern (Akinola and Tella, 2013, p.74). This potential complicity is 
exacerbated by the weakness and corruption of the Nigerian state (Akinola and 
Tella, 2013, p.74). Given that Nigeria hold Africa’s largest oil reserves and is the 
most populous state on the continent, Boko Haram threatens wider political, 
economic and security interests in Africa: instability in Nigeria would have 
“continent-wide, possibly global, implications” (Ladislaw, 2013, p.1). As of yet, 
however, the only attack by Boko Haram that would fit such a category was the 
bombing of the United Nations headquarters in Abuja in 2011 (BBC, 2011). Other 
attacks have targeted Nigerian government officials and military and religious 
leaders rather than Americans.  
 
The fear, therefore, is not so much that  terrorist groups will launch an attack on 
the United States, but more that they will destabilise the region and jeopardise 
the flow of oil from Nigeria and the surrounding countries (such as Chad, 
Equatorial Guinea, Gabon and Benin). Initial predictions stated that by 2015 the 
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United States would be getting around 25% of its oil from Africa (Taylor, 2010, 
p.131). Nigeria is the key to stability in West Africa, and if major terrorist groups 
were able to take root here, such as AQIM, the capacity of Nigeria and other West 
African states to maintain stability and keep up the flow of oil would be severely 
tested (Morris and Edel, 2006, p.287). In the 2002 National Security Strategy of 
the United States, Nigeria was described as an anchor state in Africa, along with 
South Africa, Ethiopia and Kenya (Obama, 2002, p.10). Attacks by Boko Haram 
and Ansaru in the north of Nigeria have the potential to destabilise the entire 
country despite its diplomatic weight, economic size and strong military. The U.S. 
has therefore been very interested in assisting Nigeria with its counterterrorism 
efforts, imparting lessons learned in Iraq and Afghanistan (Varhola and Sheperd, 
2013, p.327). The recognition of the threat posed by the spread of terrorism 
across West Africa and the trans-Sahara region, led the U.S. the implement a “pre-
emptive and integrated strategy” that addresses the multiple causes of conflict 
and extremism in the region (Emerson, 2006, p.258). If violent terrorist and 
extremist groups gained a foothold in the north of Nigeria, the consequences 
could be severe not only for the rest of the country but also for West Africa, the 
Pan-Sahel and the Gulf of Guinea (Morris and Edel, 2006, p.293).  
 
Attention to Islamic terrorism in Nigeria has been reignited by a resurgence of 
attacks by Boko Haram, which has been waging a low-intensity conflict with 
Nigerian security forces since 2003 (Akinola and Tella, 2013, p.74).  Although 
mostly concentrated in northern Nigeria, Boko Haram threatens the stability of 
Nigeria as a whole as well as the wider sub-Saharan region. Violence intensified 
after the founder of Boko Haram, Mohammad Yusuf, was killed by police in 2009. 
The group re-emerged in force, and between 2009 and 2012 over 900 people 
were killed and thousands wounded in terrorist attacks. Security forces, 
traditional rulers and religious leaders were particularly targeted: Yusuf’s 
teachings condemned all government institutions and personnel for 
incorporating Western values (Akinola and Tella, 2013, pp.71-72). From the 
starting point in the northern states of Bauchi, Kano, Yobe and Borno the attacks 
spread across the country. The Nigerian state met violence with violence, and 
over 700 people died during battles between Boko Haram and the security forces 
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(Solomon, 2012, p.6). Boko Haram was also responsible for the bombing of the 
UN headquarters in Abuja in 2011, as well as numerous attacks on police stations 
and churches (Østebø, 2012, p.2). In June 2011 a Joint Task Force was set up by 
the federal government, consisting of the army, navy, air force, Department of 
State Security and the police. The borders between northern Nigeria and 
neighbouring countries were also closed (Solomon, 2012, p.7).   
On November 13th 2013 the United States government announced that Boko 
Haram and its splinter group Ansaru had been formally designated as Foreign 
Terrorist Organizations and Specially Designated Global Terrorists. Ansaru split 
from Boko Haram in 2012, and has been responsible for attacks against civilians 
and security personnel. Both groups are thought to have links to AQIM in the 
form of financing and training (U.S. Department of State, 2013). Both Boko 
Haram and AQIM have also issued statement pledging mutual support and 
commending the other on their actions (Ladislaw, 2013, p.5). The results of these 
designations include an asset freeze against Boko Haram and Ansaru as well as a 
prohibition against deliberately providing material support to either 
organization.  
 
The decision to put these two groups on the list was the result of a debate that 
has been raging since the bombing of the UN headquarters in Abuja in 2011. 
Individual Boko Haram leaders (Abubakar Shekau, Khalid al-Barnawi, and 
Abubakur Kambar) had been designated as an individual terrorist in June 2012, 
and Nigeria’s President Jonathan designated both groups as terrorist 
organisations in June 2013, a month after declaring a state of emergency in 
Nigeria’s north-eastern provinces. The decision by the United States to follow 
suit suggests a closer alignment between Nigeria and the United States (State 
Department officials described the move as notifying the world “that the United 
States and Nigeria are jointly combatting the extremist violence of Boko Haram 
and Ansaru” (U.S. Department of State, 2013)), although some argue that such a 
designation has no practical effect and may in fact reduce the scope for United 
States potential involvement in a future political resolution of the conflict 
(Campbell, 14 November 2013). The State Department, however, claimed that 
the designation will help the United States to assist Nigeria in developing a 
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comprehensive approach to addressing the terrorist threat from Boko Haram 
and Ansaru (U.S. Department of State, 2013). The reasons provided by State 
Department officials  for the designation were that Nigeria is an important 
strategic partner of the United States, it is Africa’s most populous country, 
provides thousands of soldiers and police for peacekeeping missions, and is a 
crucial global oil supplier (U.S. Department of State, 2013). Nigeria’s capacity to 
keep producing oil is clearly stated as being a contributing factor in the decision 
to declare Boko Haram and Ansaru a terrorist threat.  
 
Beyond Islamic terrorism, terrorist activity is also a concern in the Niger Delta 
region of Nigeria. At the root much of this domestically targeted terrorism is 
poverty, political disempowerment, frustration with the environmental damage 
caused by oil production, and anger at the unfair distribution of oil revenues 
(Morris and Edel, 2006, p.293). Violence in the Niger Delta region more directly 
threatens Nigeria’s capacity to produce oil; local militias steal hundreds of 
thousands of barrels of oil every day, reducing the global supply of crude oil and 
providing funding for rebel groups like MEND (Morris and Edel, 2006, p.288).  
The unrest in the region largely stems from the efforts to draw attention to and 
stop the environmental damage caused by oil production (Ploch, 2007, pp.12-
13).  Militants from the Delta’s largest ethnic group, the Ijaw, launched Operation 
Climate Change in 1998, resulting in violent clashes with the military and 
disrupting oil production. In 2004 another rebel group emerged demanding 
autonomy for the Niger Delta, the NDPVF, which carried out attacks on 
government forces and threatened foreign oil workers. Amnesty International 
estimated that 500 people were killed in September of that year alone. There has 
been vandalism and sabotage of oil production infrastructure, widespread 
production theft (known as oil bunkering), kidnappings, and protests (Ploch, 
2007, p.13). Since 2006 conflict between the Delta’s militant groups and the 
Nigerian military have escalated, and the number of kidnappings of foreign oil 
workers has increased. MEND emerged in 2005, and utilised the kidnappings as a 
means of drawing international attention to the situation in the Delta. Attacks by 
these groups cut oil production by an estimated 25% in 2007, as well as 
threatening deep-water production (Ploch, 2007, p.14). 
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In May 2009 a renewed offensive against militant groups was launched by the 
Nigerian Joint Task Force (JTF), which had originally been set up in 2004 to 
restore order to the Niger Delta. Thousands were displaced in the fighting 
between the JTF and militants as well as by air and land strikes launched against 
militant camps. Despite this, sabotage by MEND and other groups increased in 
mid-2009, reducing oil production by around 273,000 barrels per day (Ploch, 
2010b, p.23). An amnesty declared in October 2009 led to over 15,000 militants 
turning in their weapons and oil production increasing, but analysts argued that 
without addressing the root causes of the conflict the ceasefire would only be 
temporary (Ploch, 2010b, p.23). U.S. military assistance does little to improve the 
situation. 
China 
The third factor which has played a role in the securitization of U.S.-Nigeria 
relations has been in expansion of the Chinese presence (both economic and 
military) in Nigeria. Chinese multinationals have invested significant amounts in 
Nigeria’s oil industry. In 2006 CNOOC acquired a 45 percent stake in a major 
offshore oil field in Nigeria work $2.7 billion.  CNOOC was backed by a US$1.6 
billion loan from the Chinese Eximbank to support its operations in Nigeria, 
indicating the level of support the Chinese government offers to its oil companies 
overseas (Yi-Chong, 2008, p.31). In May 2010, the Nigerian National Petroleum 
Corporation (NNPC) signed a $23 billion agreement with China to build three 
new oil refineries and a petrochemicals complex. This was especially beneficial 
for Nigeria at the time as two of its existing four refineries were only running at 
60 percent capacity (Ploch, 2010b, p.4). Chinese companies have been involved 
in Nigeria’s oil industry since 1997, when the China National Petroleum 
Corporation (CNPC) began exploration in the Chad Basin. A year later CNPC 
purchased two blocks in the Niger River Delta region (Downs, 2000, p.22). 
Although the true extent to which the Chinese government controls these 
companies is uncertain, the government owns very large stakes in such 
companies (in the range of 80-90%) and selects the companies’ leaders. Chinese 
banks provide low-interest loans, and Chinese diplomats are often found 
smoothing the way for company operations (Klare, 2006, p.182). Beyond direct 
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investment in oil fields and oil companies, China has also been funding the 
infrastructure upgrades necessary to transport oil and improve the efficiency of 
the energy sector. In 2008, a Chinese engineering firm signed a $1 billion deal to 
construct a road in Port Harcourt, the hub of Nigeria’s oil industry. Port Harcourt 
is the capital of Rivers state in the Niger Delta, where poor infrastructure, lack of 
investment, and slow economic growth has fuelled violent unrest; the Nigerian 
arm of the German construction firm Bilfinger Berger pulled out of the region due 
to security concerns. Developing infrastructure is one of the government’s 
solutions to the unrest in the region, now assisted by China (Tattersall, 2008).  
 
The intervention of the Chinese government in the expansion activities of 
Chinese oil companies reflects global competition for oil and concerns about the 
potential for “resource wars” as demand in emerging economies increase. The 
worldwide energy industry’s ability to meet the needs of existing industrial 
powers, let alone newly industrialising states in Africa and Asia, is in doubt 
(Dobransky, 2010, p.355). States such as China and the United States can, and do, 
use government-backed investment, arms sales and other forms of cooperation 
as leverage to obtain favourable access for their companies as well as help boost 
the capacity of producers to maintain order (Dobransky, 2010, pp.354-55).  
 
In 2001 China gave $1 million to Nigeria to upgrade its military facilities, arguing 
that it was part of China’s “contribution to the development of democracy in 
Nigeria” (Chou, 2007, pp.38-39). In 2004, the Chinese defense contractor Poly 
Technology announced a partnership with the state-owned Defense Industries 
Corporation of Nigeria, which has since resumed production of small arms, 
grenades and ammunition for the Nigerian army after years of neglect (Klare and 
Volman, 2006, p.305). Nigeria has also increased arms imports from China, 
receiving 15 F-7 fighter aircraft in 2005 for a reported $251 million (Volman, 
2009, p.10) and received another $2 million worth of military equipment as a 
donation. Chinese military personnel were also pledged to provide training in 
“computers, air field sweeper vehicles, emergency navigational and light vehicles, 
and deep sea diving equipment” (Chou, 2007, pp.38-39). In 2006, Nigeria 
criticised the United States for not providing sufficient protection for the 
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country’s oil infrastructure from terrorist attacks in the Niger Delta. 
Congressional interference in the delivery of patrol boats for the delta region 
bred frustration. Nigeria claimed that promised deliveries of military equipment 
from the U.S. were slow to arrive, and that Nigeria had increasingly turned to 
China instead for military supplies (Mahtani, 2006). Nigeria purchased fighter 
jets and missiles along with guarantees for training of Nigerian satellite 
technicians from China, which coincided with the awarding of oil contracts to 
Chinese firms in 2005-2006 (Alden, 2007, p.26). In 2013 the China Shipbuilding 
and Offshore International Company (CSOC) was contracted by the Nigerian 
Navy to upgrade its naval facilities at Port Harcourt so that the base will be able 
to carry out maintenance work on ships and construct offshore patrol vessels 
(OPVs). This follows from a contract for China to build two OPVs in 2009: the 
upgraded naval dockyard will allow it to complete the construction onsite in 
Nigeria (Nkala, 2013).  
 
The U.S. has, however, provided Nigeria with a number of naval vessels, such as a 
number of inshore patrol vessels, ex-Coast Guard Hamilton class cutters like the 
NNS Thunder and the Gallatin, and survey ships (Nkala, 2013). The U.S. has also 
been establishing military bases across the content, the prominent being Camp 
Lemonier in Djibouti, which serves as the headquarters for America’s 
counterterrorism activities in Africa. The U.S. Navy has been spending an 
increasing amount of time patrolling the coast of West Africa and the Gulf of 
Guinea, leaving their traditional stomping grounds in the Mediterranean (Yi-
Chong, 2008, p.22). In this sense they are leaving China far behind, as it has no 
military bases on the African continent at all - or anywhere else for that matter 
(People's Daily Online., 2013).  
 
Although this expansion of Chinese activities and influence in Nigeria does not 
necessarily make it a threat to the United States, this is how it is being 
interpreted as it plays into broader fears of the potential challenge China might 
poste to U.S. hegemony in the coming years. As Xu Yi-Chong argues, China’s 
economic power is changing the “strategic and economic playing field in Africa” 
and is “part of its move to the global stage” (Yi-Chong, 2008, p.31), which has 
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generated uncertainty about the future of the global and regional balance of 
power. Its growing demand for oil and other natural resources has brought this 
move to the forefront, especially as it has coincided with a resurgence in 
America’s interest in Africa due to the war on terrorism and concerns about 
energy security (Yi-Chong, 2008, p.31). Unless America and China learn to 
cooperate and respect each other’s interests in Africa, the potential for conflict 
remains, as it does in other regions of the world where their interests are 
clashing. 
 
Why does this matter? 
As discussed in section one, securitization is not always beneficial. In the opinion 
of many, it can lead to increased human rights abuses, prop up authoritarian 
regimes, worsen environmental damage, and reduce the resources that could 
otherwise be spent on poverty alleviation, good governance, and democracy. 
When policy becomes securitized, the array of strategies which are considered 
when assessing a situation is narrowed, and the situation may in fact end up 
being exacerbated. In many instances, outside intervention such as the 
introduction of more arms into a conflict serves only to prolong the fighting or 
instability, severely harming a countries development prospects by damaging 
institutions and infrastructure, displacing civilians and forcing investment 
partners to withdraw from the country. In the Democratic Republic of the Congo, 
for instance, prolonged armed conflict has led to an increase in police and 
military expenditure while reducing funding for health and education (UNDP, 
2010, p.58). In the Central African Republic, insecurity, political instability and 
damage to the country’s administrative and economic infrastructure caused 
many organizations and development partners to leave the country, harming its 
capacity to meet development goals (UNDP, 2010, p.57).  In Nigeria, decades of 
civil war and misrule by military regimes has left millions in poverty (a 2010 
estimate placed 84% of the population living on two dollars a day), with 
corruption rampant and government institutions failing (Afrodad, 2005, p.iv). 
Security is a concept which brings with it its own history and connotations8, and 
                                                             
8 In historical terms security is the field “states threaten each other, challenge each other's 
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at its heart still contains a concern with defense and the state. Placing an issue 
under the rubric of security “still evokes an image of threat-defense” and gives 
the state the main role in resolving it, which as has been shown is not always 
beneficial (Waever 1998). There are concerns that governments with less than 
exemplary human rights records such as Nigeria, whose security forces have 
been accused of humans rights violations when dealing with violence in the Niger 
Delta and terrorists in the northern states, will be embraced by the U.S. so long as 
they continue to cooperate in the GWOT, and in Nigeria’s case, continue to pump 
oil. Efforts towards peaceful resolution of the disputes between terrorists and 
insurgents and the government, as well as towards reaching development goals 
risk being pushed aside in favour of narrow security and stability concerns 
(Dagne, 2002, pp.4-5). It has been argued that U.S. military interventions in North 
Africa and the Sahel (as well as elsewhere) have only served to reinforce 
authoritarian methods of governance through “the provision of more high-
technology surveillance, weapons and security systems” as well as by reinforcing 
the role of government security forces above civilian actors.  This entrenches 
undemocratic regimes and government practices and impedes the growth of civil 
society (Keenan, 2008, p.19).  This, it is, feared will have the knock-on effect of 
creating greater unrest and dissatisfaction among local populations, resulting in 
fertile breeding grounds for extremism and militancy, as has been seen in the 
Sahel and with the rise of al-Shabaab in Somalia and the Tuareg rebellions in 
Niger and Mali (Keenan, 2010, p.36). 
 
Nigeria is a case in point. The military has been accused of indiscriminate killings 
and retaliations in response to attacks by Boko Haram on security forces. 
Soldiers have been accused of destroying homes, indiscriminately executing 
civilians alongside militants, arbitrary arrests and detentions and extortion 
(Human Rights Watch, 2013). Human Rights Watch (HRW) claims that around 
half the 4700 deaths associated with Boko Haram so far have been caused by the 
Nigerian security forces, including civilians caught in the crossfire.  The 
government has been matching violence with violence; in April 2013, for 
                                                                                                                                                                               
sovereignty, try to impose their will on each other, defend their independence, and so on”.  While 
the overwhelming military connotations of the term have faded somewhat, the ideas of defense 
and defending state sovereignty have remained central (Waever 1998).  
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example, the military attacked the village of Baga in north-eastern Nigeria after 
claiming militants were using the town as a refuge. Over two hundred people 
were killed and hundreds more wounded, with witnesses describing civilians 
being shot as they ran from their homes (Verini, 2013). The Nigerian army 
refuted the claims, saying that only six civilians had died along with thirty Boko 
Haram members (Nossiter, 2013). After the incident, the U.S. pledged to use 
diplomatic measures to pressure “the Nigerian government and military to make 
the protection of civilians a cardinal policy of its anti-terror Internal Security 
Operations”, but there was no mention of suspending military cooperation or 
other security assistance, despite the U.S. being barred from providing such 
assistance to countries that violate human rights. Secretary of State John Kerry 
made a statement condemning the violence, saying that “We are also deeply 
concerned by credible allegations that Nigerian security forces are committing 
gross human rights violations, which, in turn, only escalate the violence and fuel 
extremism” (Kerry, 2013). 
 
Although the U.S. government has measures (such as the Leahy Amendment9) in 
place to prevent security assistance being provided to security forces with 
known human rights abuses, the State Departments’, lack of resources relative to 
the Pentagon, may prevent thorough vetting of foreign security personnel being 
carried out (Ploch, 2010a, pp.37-38). Furthermore, training of internal security 
forces by the U.S. military may blur the lines between the roles of the military and 
the police as well as undermining the role of civilian authority in matters of 
internal security (Serafino, 2013, p.19). Some have also argued that the 
designation of Boko Haram as a terrorist organization by the United States acts 
as an endorsement of the current tactics being used by the Nigerian government 
and does nothing to quell human rights abuses by security forces (O'Connor, 
2013). U.S. Defense Secretary Robert Gates argued that “military action should be 
subordinate to political and economic efforts to undermine extremism” (Tyson, 
2008), which is the exact opposite of the trajectory Nigeria is currently following, 
encouraged by U.S. military and security assistance.  
                                                             
9 The Leahy Amendment prohibits the U.S. Department of State and Department of Defense from 
providing military assistance to armed forces with records of human rights violations. 
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The administration of Goodluck Johnson has responded to the worsening 
security situation by strengthening the role of the security forces and the 
military.  The Terrorism Prevention Act was signed into law in 2011, and in the 
2012 budget, security received double the funding of education and healthcare 
(Okogu, 2012, p.18). The armed forces were deployed to the northern states of 
Borno, Adamawa and Yobe in 2013 after the President declared a state of 
emergency, but the increase in troop numbers has done little to prevent attacks 
from occurring (Akinola and Tella, 2013, p.75). In fact, the security services and 
military have been accused of arbitrary, extra-judicial killings of both actual and 
suspected members of Boko Haram as well as of civilians (Akinola and Tella, 
2013, p.76). The worst violence takes place in the most socioeconomically 
underdeveloped regions of Nigeria: the north, where Islamic groups like Boko 
Haram challenge what they view as a state corrupted by the West, and the 
southeast, where environmental degradation from oil production has destroyed 
livelihoods, resulting in pipeline sabotage, oil bunkering, kidnappings, bombings 
and other violent acts (Akinola and Tella, 2013, p.76). 
 
Beyond violent reactions again the heavy-handedness of the security forces, one 
of the core causes of unrest in the Niger Delta region is the enormous 
environmental damage caused by oil production. Poor environmental protections 
are increasingly being recognised as violations of human rights: “pollution of 
water, soil and air” can result in “violations variously of rights to an adequate 
standard of living, to adequate food, to water, to adequate housing, to health and 
to life” (Amnesty International, 2009, p.12). The area’s fragile “riverine 
ecosystem” has been severely harmed by numerous oil spills, not only causing 
irreparable harm to a valuable ecosystem, but also damaging the livelihoods of 
the local people who rely on the river. Much oil production infrastructure is 
located close to “home, farms and water sources” (Amnesty International, 2009, 
p.11) in the Delta, making any pollution that much more severely felt. Besides oil 
spills (the World Bank estimates that 300 major oil spills occur every year in the 
Delta and Rivers states; an estimated 1.1 million barrels were spilled between 
1975 and 2005 alone (Agbiboa, 2013, p.451)). There are also gas flares which 
cause acid rain and air pollution, the depletion of fish stocks, the destruction of 
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mangrove forests, and the contamination of fresh water supplies. Whether the 
majority of oil spills have been caused by oil theft and illegal refineries or poorly 
maintained infrastructure and operation failings remains hotly debated. What is 
not debatable is the land, air and water pollution caused by the spills, regardless 
of who is to blame, destroying fish stocks, contaminating drinking water and 
rendering arable land unusable. It is also a major cause of unemployment as the 
majority of the population are farmers and fishermen who have had their 
livelihoods destroyed by oil pollution and gas flares (Agbiboa, 2013, p.451). In 
Ogoniland, for example, where many of the region’s militant groups originate, it 
has been estimated by the United States Environment Program that the damage 
done to the environment by over fifty years of oil production could take up three 
decades to remedy, assuming oil production were to cease (EIA, 2013b). The 
emergence of militant groups like MEND and the NDPVF has been blamed on the 
combination of environmental degradation, lack of economic opportunities, and 
years of government by a military regime (Okonta, 2006, p.711): one of MEND’s 
stated goals is to achieve a more equitable distribution of Nigeria’s oil wealth and 
to obtain reparations for decades of environmental damage (Agbiboa, 2013, 
p.457).  
 
Amnesty International argues that oil production has severely degraded living 
standards in the region, violating the local population’s basic rights (Amnesty 
International, 2009, p.13). Environmental protections are a key part of poverty 
reduction programmes in places like the Niger Delta where most of the 
population relies on the environment to live. It was in fact included in the 
Millennium Development Goals (MDGs), which Nigeria pledged to fulfil: MDG 7 
states that states should work to “reduce environmental degradation arising 
from natural and manmade causes” (UNDP, 2006, p.73). The focus on oil 
production blinds the government to other opportunities which could be 
exploited in the Niger Delta in order to address many of the grievances which 
have caused militants to take up arms in the first place. This could include the 
creation of “agro-based and allied businesses, other industries and tourism” to 
generate sustainable development, reduce unemployment and help to mitigate 
conflict (UNDP, 2006, p.155). The emphasis on Nigeria’s oil sector which is 
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reinforced by the attentions of the United States only serves to prolong the 
unbalanced and corrupt Nigerian economic state of affairs. It is estimated the 
over $380 billion has been stolen by political and military elites in Nigeria since 
oil exports began in the 1970s. Oil money has strengthened the corrupt elites 
who have ruled Nigeria unaccountably for decades, leaving millions in poverty 
and vulnerable to diseases and death (Ploch, 2010b, pp.15-17).  
The emphasis placed on oil production by the Nigerian government and by the 
international community, exemplified by the security resources dedicated to 
protecting it, makes it difficult to ensure environmental protections are put in 
place and observed. There is no incentive to increase human rights protections, 
shift resources to development, establish environmental standards or to make a 
concerted effort to mitigate the harm that has already been done in the decades 
of oil production, as Nigeria is gaining military equipment, training and funds as 
well as a sense of diplomatic importance to the United States as long as this is 
portrayed as a security issue. A reliance on military means to control the 
situation in the Delta does nothing to address the underlying causes of conflict 
and more often than not only serves to exacerbate the situation. MEND, for 
example, is one of the rebel groups fighting the oil industry in the Niger Delta and 
has been responsible for theft, kidnapping, sabotage and other forms of guerrilla 
warfare. In 2006 it stated that oil companies must “Leave our land while you can 
or die in it … Our aim is to totally destroy the capacity of the Nigerian 
government to export oil” (Agbiboa, 2013, p.458).  
 
Alternatives to Securitization  
What would U.S. policy look like were it not securitized? How would U.S. 
engagement with countries in Africa? This is not an abstract question, as 
securitization efforts can fail, and issues can be desecuritized. For example, 
during the Cold War, the administration of President Ronald Reagan attempted 
to securitise the relationship with Africa. African countries that were part of the 
“Third World, were viewed as vital strategic assets in the competition with the 
Soviet Union for influence. The Reagan administration attempted to argue that 
the Soviet Union was trying to gain control over Africa’s strategic resources as a 
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way of blackmailing the Western bloc. Viewed through this securitized lens, the 
U.S. supported the apartheid regime in South Africa, as South Africa was an 
important ally against the spread of Soviet influence and ensuring the West’s 
continue access to Africa’s resources. However, there were counter-discourses 
framed around issues of human rights which challenged the discourse presented 
by the U.S. government and were eventually more successful in creating the 
dominant frame that shaped U.S.-African relations at this time. This view held 
that Third World conflicts had little if any impact on U.S. national security and 
that this rubric facilitated an “overmilitarisation of civilian conflict” that would be 
counterproductive in the long run by producing greater instability and hostility 
towards the U.S (Marsh, 1998). This example shows that attempts by actors to 
securitize an issue can indeed fail (Vultee, 2010, p.34).  
 
 
When framed as a humanitarian or development issue, policy towards Africa 
becomes the primary responsibility of the United States Agency for International 
Development (USAID) and the Department of State. Framed as a security 
problem, in contrast, places responsibility for formulating policy on the 
Department of Defense (Abrahamsen, 2004, p.680). Furthermore, the way in 
which problems are approach differs depending on the frame used. For instance, 
from a development rather than securitized perspective, the conflict in Nigeria 
from Boko Haram, Ansaru, and Niger Delta militants is best combatted by 
reducing poverty, growing the economy, strengthening the rule of law, and 
building transparent and accountable government institutions. This could 
include greater engagement with civil society (such as young people, 
entrepreneurs, local communities) rather than just dealing with the government 
(Wharton, 2011), funding programmes to support gender equality, supporting 
agriculture and food security, and building social safety nets (MDG Africa 
Steering Group, 2008, pp.5-8) rather that spending funds on police forces and 
military training. This is not to say that the U.S. does not provide any 
development aid to Nigeria, only that development priorities tend to be 
subsumed to defense and security needs rather than the other way round.  
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If U.S. engagement with Nigeria and other African countries were not securitized, 
we would expect to see the majority of U.S. funding going towards development 
(such as governance, poverty alleviation, infrastructure and human rights) 
projects rather than towards military training and equipment. Were the 
trajectory of U.S. engagement the same as it was before 2001, the Department of 
State and USAID would have adequate resources and the requisite influence to 
carry out policy in Africa, rather than the current unbalanced situation of today, 
which sees the Pentagon with the lion’s share of both resources and influence. 
There would be a greater focus on sustainable economic engagement rather than 
an overwhelming fixation on oil and other extractive industries as well as efforts 
to make trade fairer for the African continent.  Ideally what we would see would 
be the fruition of the “whole of government” 3Ds10 approach which has been 
much discussed in U.S. government. The 2010 National Security Strategy, for 
example, wrote that one way to prevent the emergence of conflict was to 
strengthen the development agenda and employ a whole of government 
approach that spans the 3Ds (President of the United States, 2010, p.27). It 
explicitly discussed underdevelopment as a security threat that needs to be 
managed as well as the use of development as a tool to strengthen alliances with 
key states: “We are focusing on assisting developing countries and their people to 
manage security threats […] Through an aggressive and affirmative development 
agenda and commensurate resources, we can strengthen the regional partners 
we need to help us stop conflicts and counter global criminal networks […]” 
(President of the United States, 2010, p.15).    
 
 
Global development practices, such as that carried out by the United Nations 
Development Programme (UNDP), for example, recognises that the rule of law is 
“the cornerstone of economic growth, security and poverty eradication” (UNDP, 
2012, p.1). The UNDP does a lot of work towards building functioning legal 
systems in which every citizen is subject to the same laws and that are non-
discriminatory and respectful of international human rights standards. This 
approach to security reflects a concern with individual human security rather 
than that of the state, recognising the importance of “protecting and empowering 
                                                             
10 Defence, diplomacy and development. 
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people, at the individual and community levels” (OSAA, 2005, p.2). The UNDP’s 
1994 Human Development Report outlined this concept of security that went 
beyond narrow military concerns (OSAA, 2005, p.40). Intra-state instability and 
conflict has, according to this view, weakened the concept of state-centric 
security, as it highlights the connected nature of security, development and 
human rights issues. You cannot simply focus on one, as state-centric security 
does, and expect to be successful in preventing conflict and building lasting peace 
(OSAA, 2005, p.2). Broad strategies are required to address the causes of armed 
conflict as well as political and social crises, such as by “promoting sustainable 
development, poverty eradication, national reconciliation, good governance, 
democracy, gender equality, the rule of law and respect for and protection of 
human rights” (OSAA, 2005, p.5).  The proportion of national budgets and foreign 
aid allocated to military expenditure should therefore be limited in recognition of 
the fact that other factors may be more important in addressing the underlying 
causes of conflict and promoting human security and development (OSAA, 2005, 
p.28).   
 
U.S. development policy under President Obama was set out in two policy 
documents: the Presidential Policy Directive on Global Development, which sets 
out policy guidance for all U.S. government agencies, and the Quadrennial 
Diplomacy and Development Review, which explicitly addresses the question of 
how the leverage civilian power to meet development objectives. The approach 
to international development outlined in these policy documents has three 
features: an emphasis on sustainable development; a focus on effectiveness, 
results and collaboration among donors; and a whole of government approach to 
development that works to utilise capabilities across multiple government 
departments (OECD, 2011).  
 
At a press conference in 2013, the Deputy Assistant Secretary for African Affairs 
at the Department of State, Bruce Wharton, laid out the U.S. government’s policy 
in Africa. He outlined the five pillars of the Obama administration’s Africa policy: 
democracy promotion; economic growth; health care; conflict resolution; and 
transnational challenges.  These five pillars represent an interesting mix of 
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security and development objectives. Democracy, economic growth and health 
are all traditional development goals and have equivalents in the MDGs. Conflict 
resolution and transnational challenges (such as smuggling, piracy and 
terrorism) fall more towards the national security end of the spectrum (Wharton, 
2011).  The aim of providing peace in Africa is one area where the liens between 
development and security become the most blurred. President Obama said in 
2009 that as “long as parts of Africa continue to be ravaged by war and mayhem, 
opportunity and democracy cannot take root” (Obama, 2013). Providing security 
in such an environment almost inevitably involves the use of armed force and 
requires the presence of the American military in Africa, which changes the 
dynamic of engagement immediately.  
 
USAID is the government agency charged with formulating and carrying out U.S. 
development policy and as such would be expected to take the lead on Africa 
policy, along with the Department of State. Like many other government aid 
agencies, since 2000 it has drawn on the MDGs in creating development 
programmes. At a global level, foreign engagement with and assistance to Africa 
has been in large part centred on these MDGs. For members of the Organization 
for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) members, the Paris 
Declaration on Aid Effectiveness and the Development Assistance Committee 
(DAC) are the two main guiding points for engagement with African development 
countries. USAID, however, is chronically underfunded and understaffed. 
Although government policy statements may laud the importance of 
development to security, actual funding and resource allocations suggest other 
priorities. USAID is not the only provider of U.S. foreign assistance, however, 
which has resulted in a "complex web of foreign assistance programs, agencies 
and earmarked funding” (Blue et al., 2011, p.v) that is subject to political 
influence from Congress and domestic interest groups (Blue et al., 2011, p.vi). 
Poverty reduction is not, in fact, an “explicit overarching objective of US 
development co-operation”, although some programmes are oriented in that 
direction (such as programs focused on food security and health) (OECD, 2011, 
p.12). Other important government agencies are the Departments of State, Health 
and Human Services, Defense and Treasury.  
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Another area which President Obama’s Africa policy has focused on and should 
be assigned greater economic resources is economic growth, trade and 
investment. Economic growth in Africa is a win-win situation for the United 
States, as new markets for American businesses increases economic growth and 
jobs at home as well as in Africa. The Africa Growth and Opportunity Act (AGOA) 
is one result of this policy: the act is the cornerstone of U.S. trade policy with 
Africa and has created thousands of jobs in Africa (Carson, 2013, p.319). Energy 
is another important aspect of the economic side of the U.S.-Africa relationship, 
and not just oil. The State Department has led energy delegations to countries in 
East and West Africa, and the U.S. government’s Overseas Private Investment 
Corporation (OPIC) allocated US$1.7 billion to Africa in 2012 to help promote 
clean energy projects across the continent (Carson, 2013, p.319).  
 
Some examples of programs, policies and initiatives that would take greater 
priority under a desecuritized Africa policy are as follows:  
 Feed the Future: this programme aims to address challenges to food 
security and nutrition such as developing climate-resilient cereals, 
combatting pests and diseases and producing nutritious and safe foods 
(Shrier, 2013).  US$3.5 billion was allocated by President Obama to kick-
start a green revolution must like the one which transformed agriculture 
in Asia and Latin America in the 1970s and 1980s (Carson, 2013, p.322).  
 The Global Health Initiative, which builds on the President’s Emergency 
Plan for AIDS Relief (PEPFAR) to construct a more comprehensive health 
program that addresses other major disease threats such as malaria, 
tuberculosis and hepatitis, as well as strengthening and expanding the 
reach of Africa’s medical institutions (Carson, 2013, p.322).  
 Trade Africa aims to promote trade, market driven economic growth and 
investment. The aim of the program is to increase internal and regional 
trade in Africa as well as trade with the United States. It aims to address 
global trade imbalances that have left Africa with less than three percent 
of world trade, most of which is concentrated in oil, gas and natural 
resources (Carson, 2013, p.322).  
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 The partnership between Chevron, USAID and the Niger Delta Partnership 
Initiative Foundation set up by Chevron to help address social and 
economic challenges in the Niger Delta region. According to the 
agreement, USAID and the Foundation will each contribute USD 25 million 
over four years to “promote economic development, improve the capacity 
of government and civil society institutions, and help reduce conflict in 
the region” (OECD, 2011, p.37). 
 Power Africa – an initiative that aims to double access to electricity in 
Sub-Saharan Africa through U.S. government investment and partnership 
with the private sector (Obama, 2013). 
o This initiative recognises the limitations that a lack of transport, 
power, water, sanitation and communication networks place e on 
economic growth and poverty reduction across Africa.  Electricity, 
for example, is vital to achieving economic growth and thus 
reducing poverty, yet 35 countries in Africa are still experiencing a 
power crisis with frequent interruptions. Funding for projects like 
Power Africa will be a significant help in meetings the MDGs and 
other development goals (Group, 2008, p.16). It builds on the 
energy program initiated by the State Department in 2011, which 
aimed to bring American private sector companies in contact with 
the growing commercial opportunities in the power industry in 
Africa.  Power Africa will initially work with six countries (Ethiopia, 
Ghana, Kenya, Liberia, Nigeria and Tanzania) to double access to 
power in sub-Saharan Africa. The U.S. government (contributing $7 
billion) will partner with private companies such as General 
Electric (expected to contribute $9 billion over the next five years) 
to increased reliable access to electricity for over 20,000 
households across Africa (Carson, 2013, p.323).  
 Investing in institutions rather than dictators: building strong justice 
systems, stamping out corruption, encouraging transparent and 
accountable government, and fostering civil society (Obama, 2013). For 
instance, rather than increasing funding and training for the armed forces, 
investing in strengthening the governance systems and the rule of law 
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through assisting poor and marginalized people to access the legal system 
, supporting the establishment and implementation of rules and laws,  
creating efficient, accountable and legitimate security institutions, and so 
on (UNDP, 2011, p.1). 
 Focus on “broad-based economic growth” rather than on the extractive 
sector alone: investing in infrastructure, encouraging entrepreneurship, 
creating hospitable business environments, promoting open markets, and 
lowering trade barriers (OECD, 2011, p.25).  
 A more comprehensive view of security that goes beyond military 
concerns and the absence of war. This would focus on human dignity and 
human life, and the development of individual people and communities 
rather on the state as a whole (OSAA, 2009, p.4). This concept of human 
security includes economic, food, health, environmental, personal, 
community and political security (OSAA, 2009, p.7). 
Conclusion 
This thesis has attempted to answer the question as to whether there has been a 
new securitization of U.S. policy in Africa, using the example of Nigeria as a test 
case. I have argued that a degree of securitization has taken place since 2001, 
enough to make a noticeable difference from U.S. engagement prior to this.  I 
have further argued that this has been due to three securitizing factors: concerns 
about oil security, fears about the potential disruption caused by terrorism and 
insurgency, and the rise in China. To research this question I first examined the 
general trend of U.S. engagement with Africa as a whole before turning a more 
detailed analysis of U.S. engagement with Nigeria from 1960 (when Nigeria 
became an independent country) to the present day. I looked at sources such as 
official statements, development aid, economic relations and military 
cooperation, and compared the type of engagement that took place from 1960 to 
2001 to that which took place from 2001 to the present.  I found that prior to 
2001, U.S. engagement with Nigeria was primarily concerned with trade, 
particularly oil. There was very little political or military engagement, especially 
in the 1990s when Nigeria was ruled by a military dictatorship. After 2001 and 
the terrorist attacks on the World Trade Centre, however, U.S. engagement with 
Nigeria noticeably intensified and took on a militaristic overtone. It has taken the 
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form of increased military aid (such as training programmes, joint missions and 
the provision of military equipment) as well as the founding of AFRICOM in 2007. 
The securitization of Africa has been slow but steady, especially since 2001, and 
increased in intensity in 2007. By 2014 it is expected that the number of U.S. 
troops in Africa will reach 5000, which is brigade level strength, and will be 
active in “38 out of Africa’s 54 nations” (Stewart, 2014).  
Having said that, it does seem clear that a securitized aspect to U.S. policy in 
Africa is not a completely new occurrence. Development and diplomacy have 
always competed with defense for influence in shaping U.S. foreign affairs, and 
Africa policy has been no exception. During the 1970s for example, oil scares led 
to the dominance of more national security-oriented concerns in U.S. policy. In 
the 1990s however, human rights concerns took precedence, and for at least part 
of the decade national interest was partially subsumed to the more altruistic 
notion of upholding human rights in Nigeria. This competition between different 
interests and motivations mean that the securitization process has not been 
uncontested. Despite the boost given to defense concerns by the GWOT, 
development and human rights concerns remain relevant in U.S. foreign policy 
making. This may be because opposition to further involvement in foreign 
countries by the military is still strong both within and without the U.S., meaning 
that the U.S. has had to proceed carefully and downplay any potential role for the 
military in Africa. AFRICOM’s headquarters, for example, are located in Stuttgart, 
Germany, given that “no African nation has agreed to host the full U.S. command” 
(Stewart, 2014). Counter-discourses remain, for the most part propagated by the 
development community, including government agencies like USAID. Attempts to 
enhance the role of diplomacy and development in Africa to balance the role of 
the military have been made, but due to budgetary constraints have not been 
overly successful.  
 
However, since around 2005-2006 the rhetoric justifying the growing role of the 
U.S. military in Africa began to shift from an emphasis on the GWOT and energy 
security to include a greater focus on humanitarianism and the development-
security nexus, a “security-development” discourse similar to that which guided 
the development policy of the New Labour government in the United Kingdom. 
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This new emphasis focuses on the development of civilian capacity on the 
continent and may be a reflection of negative feedback from the greater visibility 
of the U.S. military in Africa given the negative publicity generated from the wars 
in Afghanistan and Iraq. Underneath though, whether the U.S.’s policies and goals 
have truly changed is another question (Keenan, 2010, p.31). Keenan proposes 
that these new mission statements, publications and stories could be just another 
aspect of Washington’s ‘information war’ rather than a sign of a “paradigmatic 
shift  in  US  military  thinking” (Keenan, 2010, p.32). Outbreaks of civil unrest or 
‘insurgency’ are still being dealt with by military means, often with the backing of 
American military forces. U.S. forces killed an unknown number of Somali 
fighters and civilians trapped between U.S., Kenyan and Ethiopian forces (both of 
whom had American training and assistance) in 2007, for instance. 
Counterterrorism also clearly remains a high priority for U.S. military operations 
in Africa, with three VEOs being of particular concern: AQIM in the north and 
west of Africa, Boko Haram and its splinter group Ansaru in Nigeria and al 
Shabaab in Somalia (Varhola and Sheperd, 2013, p.327).  For example, in 2006, 
General James L. Jones of EUCOM stated that “The growing use of the Trans-
Sahara region in Africa by terrorists threatens the security of the United States 
and our European Allies” and that stability in Africa was a “global strategic 
imperative”. Furthermore, the Pentagon’s Quadrennial Defense Review noted the 
emergence of terrorist threats in northern and western Africa as a cause for 
concern for the U.S. (Copson, 2007, p.115). 
 
The securitization of Africa was demonstrated by an in-depth examination of the 
U.S.’s relationship with Nigeria. Nigeria was chosen because it is a major oil 
producer, is vulnerable to terrorist activity, and has been the site of considerable 
Chinese activity, making it an excellent exemplar of all three of my securitizing 
factors. It would be interesting for future research to compare the situation in 
Nigeria with other states in Africa, perhaps those that do not hold valuable oil 
resources or that have not faced the threat of terrorism, to see which factor is the 
most relevant in the securitizing process. Is this securitization process likely to 
continue into the future, or will the civilian agencies of the Department of State 
and USAID regain control of U.S. policy? Much depends on the impact that U.S. 
shale oil production has on world energy markets, as this will impact on how 
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much it matters to the U.S. if Nigeria collapses. Swing producers like Nigeria may 
well resume their importance in the U.S. world view if shale oil fails to be the 
panacea many claim it to be and competition for oil continues to intensify. 
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